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ABSTRACT

Investigation of the Robustness of Star Graph Networks
by
Xiaolong Wu
Dr. Shahram Latifi, Examination Committee Chair
Professor o f Electrical and Computer Engineering
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas

The star interconnection network has been known as an attractive alternative to «-cube
for interconnecting a large number o f processors. It possesses many nice properties, such
as vertex/edge symmetry, recursiveness, sublogarithmic degree and diameter, and
maximal fault tolerance, which are all desirable when building an interconnection
topology for a parallel and distributed system. Investigation o f the robustness o f the star
network architecture is essential since the star network has the potential o f use in critical
applications. In this study, three different reliability measures are proposed to investigate
the robustness o f the star network. First, a constrained two-terminal reliability measure
referred to as Distance Reliability (DR) between the source node u and the destination
node I with the shortest distance, in an «-dimensional star network, S„, is introduced to
assess the robustness o f the star network. A combinatorial analysis on DR especially for u
having a single cycle is performed under different failure models (node, link, combined
node/link failure). Lower bounds on the special case o f the DR\ antipode reliability, are

111
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derived, compared with «-cube, and shown to be more fault-tolerant than «-cube. The
degradation o f a container in a S„ having at least one operational optimal path between u
and / is also examined to measure the system effectiveness in the presence o f failures
under different failure models. The values o f MTTF to each transition state are calculated
and compared with similar size containers in «-cube. Meanwhile, an upper bound under
the probability fault model and an approximation under the fixed partitioning approach
on the («-l)-star reliability are derived, and proved to be similarly accurate and close to
the simulations results. Conservative comparisons between similar size star networks and
«-cubes show that the star network is more robust than «-cube in terms o f («-l)-netw ork
reliability.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
It has become generally accepted that an effective way to increase the system
throughput is to gather a large set o f processors to solve a single given complex
engineering and science problem. There is a large class o f problems that cannot be solved
efficiently in the traditional sequential computers; however, many o f them can be broken
into smaller tasks and solved efficiently in the parallel fashion.
A parallel computer is one that consists o f a collection o f processing units, or
processors, that cooperate to solve a problem by working simultaneously on different
parts of that problem. The number o f processors can vary from a few tens to several
millions. Therefore, time required to solve the complicated engineering problem by a
traditional uniprocessor computer can be significantly reduced using a parallel computer.
This approach is attractive for a number o f reasons. First, for many computational
problems, the natural solution is a parallel one. Second, according to the latest technology
development in the semiconductor industry [I], the cost and size o f computer
components have declined so sharply in recent years that parallel computers with a large
number o f processors have become feasible. Third, it is possible in parallel processing to
select the parallel architecture that is best suited to solve the problem or class o f problems
under considerations.
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Experiences o f using parallel computers to solve various problems in the past decades
by engineers and scientists in varieties o f areas have indicated that the ultimate utilization
o f parallel computers is heavily dependent on the topology o f the interconnection
network that connects processors.
Many interconnection network topologies for parallel computers have been proposed
in literatures. Among them, hypercube [8][10] is one o f the most popular and has been
studied extensively in different aspects. However, star networks [3] [4] have been
proposed as an alternative to the hypercube recently. The purpose o f this dissertation is to
investigate the robustness of the star graph by using the combinatorial methods and
Markov methods. More specifically, we study the distance reliability, the degradation o f
a container between two arbitrary nodes in an «-dimensional star graph, and the substar
reliability in the star interconnection network under the probability fault model and the
fixed partitioning, and simulation, to investigate the robustness o f the star graph.
Meanwhile, conservative comparisons with the hypercube are performed for each above
proposed merits. Throughout this dissertation, we use the terms “edge” and “link”,
“processor” and “node”, “network” and “graph”, and

and “(«-m)-star”

interchangeably.

1.1

Interconnection networks

A processor/communication interconnection network is often modeled as an
undirected graph, in which nodes correspond to processors and edges correspond to
communication links between processors. Communications over a network is achieved
by a message passing protocol, and the delay in the communication is usually measured
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in terms o f the edges traversed. Some o f the key features o f interest in an interconnection
network are its degree, diameter, congestion, symmetry, connectivity, fault tolerance,
routing algorithm, hierarchical structure, etc.
A number o f topologies o f interconnection networks have been proposed and some o f
them have been implemented in modem parallel computer systems [4][14][19][30][33]
[34]. These topologies range from simple graphs such as linear array, ring, binary tree,
and complete graph, to more sophisticated graphs such as hypercube, butterfly network,
and star network. Before we start to introduce interconnection networks, we need
following terms which are frequently used to describe an interconnection network.
Degree o f a node is the number o f nodes that are adjacent to it. We say a network is
regular if all nodes have the same degree. Degree o f a regular graph is then the degree o f
any of its vertices. Distance between a pair o f nodes is the smallest number o f links that
have been traversed to go from one to the other. Diameter of a network is the maximum
distance between any pair o f nodes. Clearly, the degree of a graph is a measure o f the
cost of interconnection networks and the diameter is a measure o f the communication
delay. Consequently, it is desirable to constmct a large graph with small degree and small
diameter.
A graph is vertex symmetric if the graph looks the same from each o f its vertices.
More formally, given any two vertices u and v there is an automorphism o f the graph that
maps u to

V.

Similarly, a graph is edge symmetric if every edge looks the same, i.e., given

any two edges i and j there is an automorphism o f the graph that maps i to j. Such
symmetry properties o f a graph are very important when viewed as an interconnection
network. For example, a vertex symmetric graph allows for all the processors to be
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identical. A vertex/edge

symmetric graph has the desirable property that the

communication load is uniformly distributed on all the nodes or over all the
communication links, so that there is no congestion across the interconnection network.
Moreover, this symmetry allows for identical nodes with identical routing algorithms. It
is also very useful in designing algorithms that exploit the structure o f the network. For a
typical «-dimensional symmetric network, if it can be decomposed into a number o f («I)-dimensional networks which has the same topological properties as the original one,
and if this decomposition can be carried out recursively, we call this network has the
recursive decomposition property.
A graph is said to be f-fault tolerant if whenever/ or fewer vertices are removed from
the graph the remaining graph always remains connected. The fa u lt tolerance o f a graph
is defined to be the largest / for which it is /-fault tolerant. Thus, the fa u lt tolerance o f a
graph can at most be d -\, where d is the degree o f the graph. The fa u lt diameter o f a
network is the maximum diameter o f the network by removing d-\ nodes. A graph whose
fault tolerance is exactly <7-1 is said to be maximally fa u lt tolerant.
Given a set o f generators for a finite group G, a Cayley graph [2] is defined as a
graph, in which nodes correspond to the elements o f the group G and edges correspond to
the action o f the generators in G. That is, there is an edge from an element a to an
element b if and only if there is a generator g such that ag = b in G. For example,
hypercubes and star graphs are two representatives o f the Cayley graph. Each o f the
Cayley graphs contains the following properties, such as node/link symmetric properties,
recursive decomposition property, maximally fault tolerant, etc. Before moving to the star
network, we introduce some common interconnection topologies as follows.
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Linear Array: The linear array [19] is the simplest connection topology. It is a one
dimensional network in which n nodes are connected by n-\ links in a line. Internal nodes
have degree 2, and the terminal nodes have degree I . The diameter o f a linear array o f n
nodes is «-I. Its structure is not symmetric and thus poses a communication inefficiency
when n becomes large.
Ring: A ring [19] is obtained by connecting the terminal nodes o f a linear array with one
extra link. A ring can be unidirectional or bidirectional. It is symmetric with a constant
node degree 2. The diameter is \_n 12 J for a bidirectional ring, and n for a unidirectional
ring.
Binary Tree: In this network [37], the nodes form a complete binary tree. A A:-level
complete binary tree has « = 2* - 1 nodes. The maximum node degree is 3 and the
diameter is 2 {k - 1).
Hypercube: The «-dimensional hypercube [14] shown in Fig. I, «-cube or Q„, has
N = 2" nodes and «2""' edges. Each node corresponds to an «-bit binary string, and two
nodes are linked with a link if and only if their binary strings differ in precisely one bit.
As a result, each node is incident to « other nodes. The edges o f the hypercube can be
naturally categorized according to the dimensions that they traverse. In particular, an
edge is called a dimension i edge if it connected two nodes that differ in the

bit

position. In addition the «-cube is a completely symmetric topology and, consequently,
minimizes congestion problems. It also permits the use of identical processors since
every vertex plays an identical role in the topology. The «-cube has a very simple and
optimal routing algorithm that routes messages between processors along a shortest path
[12]. This enables the design o f low-cost routing hardwares. Other attractive features of
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the «-cube include our familiarity and understanding o f the topology, particularly the
recursive decomposition o f the «-cube into successive cubes o f smaller sizes.

•

: Qo
110

:Qi
100i
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io y ^
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11 10
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11 O f

0111
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0011

1000

0000

1011

1001

0001

Figure 1.1. Hypercube o f dimensions 1 ,2 ,3 , and 4.

Each Qr, contains two disjoint 0„-i’s. Partitioning a Q„ can be done in « different
ways. This is implemented by removing the set o f /-links, 0 < / < « , every time. For
example, partitioning a Q4 along the 5-links results in two disjoint Qs's, XXXO and
X X X I , respectively (Fig. 1.1); while partitioning a Q4 along the 2-links results in two
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disjoint Qs’s, X X O X and X X I X , where X is either ‘0 ’ or ‘1’, and so on. It follows that
the number o f disjoint Q„.m’s in a g» is 2” , for 1 < m < « , whereas the number o f distinct

Q n -m S IS

T.

The characterization o f distinct and disjoint paths between two given nodes for the
hypercube has been addressed in [33]. If u and v are two nodes in an «-cube with the
Hamming Distance r = H ( u , v ) , then there are r\ distinct paths o f length r between u
and

V,

where there are r disjoint paths o f length r , and n - r disjoint paths o f length

r + 2 between u and v. Thus in total we can construct a family o f « disjoint paths
between u and v, which is the maximum allowable number of parallel paths between two
nodes in the «-eube.
There are also a number o f other fault tolerant properties o f the «-cube that make it
very attractive. Due to the multitude o f paths between vertices the «-cube not only
possesses optimal fault tolerance properties but provides little or no degradation of
performance in the presence o f faults. The fault tolerance o f the «-cube is «-1 and
therefore said to be maximally fault tolerant [8][35],
Butterfly Network:

The r-dimensional butterfly [19] has ( r + 1)2'' nodes and r2''^'

edges. The nodes corresponds to pair < w , i > , 0 < i < r , where i is the level or dimension
o f the node and w is an r-bit binary number that denotes the row o f the node. Two nodes
<w , i > and < w \ V > are linked by an edge if and only if / ' = / +1 and either:
1. w and w' are identical, or
2. w and w' differ in precisely the ith bit.
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If w and w' are identical, the edge is said to be a straight edge. Otherwise, the edge
is a cross edge. In addition, edges connecting nodes on levels i and i +1 are said to be
level i +1 edges. A 3-dimensional butterfly network is shown in Fig. 1.2.

row

000

001

010

O il

100

101

110

111
level = 0

level = 1

level = 2

level = 3

Figure 1.2. A 3-dimensional butterfly network.

1.2

Star interconnection network

An «-dimensional star network [4], S„, is defined as an undirected graph G = (V, E),
where V is set o f «! nodes, and E is the set o f («-l)«!/2 links. Nodes are assigned with
labels each o f which is a distinct permutation on « different symbols (we use symbols 1,
2, 3,..., «). Two nodes, u and v, are connected with a link labeled with link i if and only if
node V can be obtained through ug. = v , where g., 2 < i < n , is the generator swapping
the first symbol with the

symbol in the permutation o f node u. For example, in a 4-star

containing 24 nodes, node 3214 can be obtained by applying g j, swapping the first and
third symbols in node 1234. Fig. 1.3 shows the star graph o f dimensions 2, 3, and 4.
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1234

4231

Star graph o f dim ension 2

132
S tar graph o f dim ension 3
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Figure 1.3. Star graph o f dimensions 2, 3, and 4.

Table 1.1. Comparisons between «-cube and «-star.
«-cube

«-star graph
diameter

fault
node

degree

diameter

2"

n

n

n

diameter

node

degree

n!

n-1

fault
diameter

«

Dia+1

n+1
1

128

1

7

8

5

120

4

6

1

9

512

9

9

10

6

720

5

7

8

12

4096

12

12

13

7

5040

6

9

10

15

32768

15

15

16

8

40320

7

10

11

19

524288

19

19

20

9

362880

8

12

13
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Several researchers have investigated the algebraic properties o f the star network
using performance metrics such as number o f nodes and links, connectivity, diameter,
surface area, fault diameter, diagnosability, etc [2][4][15][20][23][36][42], The star
network can connect more processors with less interconnections and less communication
delay than the popular hypercube [12][21]. More specifically, growth in the node degree
and diameter is sub-logarithmic to the network size in star network, but logarithmic in the
hypercube. Various networks have been mapped to the star network [6] [24] [29]. A
treatment

of

communication

aspects

for

this

network

is

presented

in

[5][11][13][16][28][32]. Fault tolerance o f the star network has also been investigated
extensively in [3][9][ 17][ 18] [25][26] [27] [31 ] [38] [39][40].
Like the hypercube, the stat network has rich structure and symmetric properties as
well as maximally fault-tolerant characteristics. The star network has superior node
degree and diameter compared to the hypercube o f a comparable size. More specifically,
growth in node degree and diameter is sub-logarithmic to the network size in the star
network but logarithmic in the hypercube. This can be visualized in Table 1.1. Next we
list some major properties o f the star network.
1.2.1

Cycle representation

The node permutation can be decomposed into a sequenee o f one or more disjoint
cycles, each o f containing a set o f distinct symbols. For example, the node permutation
[42651387] in a 8-star, can be decomposed into cycles: (145)(2)(36)(78). In our ease,
cycles are built by identifying misplaced symbols in the node permutation, starting from
the leftmost position. Note that, any digit already in the correct position appears in a
cycle of length 1, or a 1-cycle. Depending on the symbol in the first position (leftmost) of

10
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the node permutation being ‘ 1’ or not, cycles can be categorized into:
•

Ordinary cycle that contains ‘ 1’

•

None-ordinary cycle that does not contain ‘ 1’

In above-mentioned example, cycle (145) is an ordinary cycle, and cycles (36), (78)
are none-ordinary cycles.
For a given source permutation, cycles can move according to the following two
rules:
•

Cycles can appear in any order

•

Cycles without “ 1” inside can be executed to reach the same destination
regardless o f the number o f cyclic shifts on the symbols;

After

applying

above

rules,

the

following

representations

(145)(2)(36)(78),

(36)(145)(2)(78), and (145)(2)(63)(78), all specify the same source permutation
[42651387].
1.2.2

Transposition

A transposition is a permutation which exchanges two elements and keeps all others
fixed [7]. For example, transposition (la,) means permutation between 1 and a,. Cycles
can be written as a product o f transpositions using the following two rules:
•

•

( ^ ,^ 2 ^ 3

=

(la, ) ( 1 « 2

)(1 « 3 ) • • •

)(1 « I )

•■•%) = (1«,)(1«2)(1«3) " ( K )

where a\ through a* denote distinct symbols from 2 to n. For example, cycle (145) can be
written as a product o f transpositions (14)(15), and cycle (36) can be written as a product
o f transpositions (13)(16)(13). If the number o f transpositions for a given node
permutation is odd, we name this node permutation odd] otherwise we name it even. The
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identity permutation is considered as even, since it involves non transposition. Since the
star graph is bipartite symmetry, the number o f the odd node permutations equals to the
number o f the even node permutations.
1.2.3

Properties of cycles

Let us consider the star transposition tree with the following correspondence between
transpositions and generators; g 2 = 0 2 ), g 3 = (13), g 4 = (14),

g „ = ( l « ) . Generators

are partially ordered according to the decreasing indices: g „ > g „ _ j> ••• > g ]> g ] •
Vertices are originally labeled as the identity permutation 1, with the symbol ‘ 1’ sitting in
the center, as shown in Fig. 1.4(a). Therefore, a product o f transpositions fo r any cycle
can be represented by a product o f the corresponding generators, where, for simplicity,
dots in products will be omitted. Based on the two different categories o f cycles, the
product o f generators can also be divided into two cases [28]:
i): Ordinary product o f generators', where the first generator is different from the
last one in the product of generators. This corresponds to the ordinary cycle. The general
form for the ordinary product o f generators can be described as g, g; g, ...g; , where
g]

^g„,and2<;j. < « .

ii): None-ordinary product o f generators', where the first generator is the same as the last
one in the product o f generators. This corresponds to the none-ordinary cycle. The
general form for this product can be described as g, g; g; ...g, g; .
For example, the ordinary product o f generators corresponding to cycle (145) is
g 4 g 5 , and the none-ordinary product o f generators corresponding to cycle (36) is
S 3 8 6 S 3 ■Next give details about the properties for each type o f the product o f generators.

12
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gn-1

g n -l

n-1
n-2

n-1

(b)

Figure 1.4. Star transposition tree o f dimension n.

Case 1: Properties o f the ordinary product o f generators
Lem m a 1: For the star graph with «-1 generators, (g^
Proof. The product

&3

~ I holds.

S a ' " S n can be considered as a sequence o f corresponding

swapping o f symbols on the transposition tree in Fig. 1.4(a). After applying the product,
every symbol on the leaf will “travel” clockwise one step starting from the first symbol,
and the last one moves to the center. The resulting placement is shown in Fig. 1.4(b).
After n such operations on the product, symbols will return to the original positions.
Q.E.D.
Each node permutations after applying the product every time is presented as follows:
n-\n

12345

«1234........«-3«-2«-l

12345........n-2n-\n
Lem m a

2:

Lemma

1 holds

for

every

ordinary

product.

In

another

word,

holds.
Proof: We can extract a subtree with an arbitrary set o f k generators and arrange its edges

13
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corresponding to some permutation o f generators in asset. After repetitive applying k+\
times o f product g, g, g,

, symbols will reach their original positions by “traveling”

on the certain leaves o f the transposition tree. Q.E.D.

7

7

7

Figure 1.5. Traveling o f symbols on the leaves o f a transposition tree after applying g^g^.

For example, after applying the product g^g^ three times, the symbols in the vertices
of tree (Fig. 1.5) will travel on the leaves (only grey ones) back to their original positions.

3
4

k-l
n-1

m-1

n-1

n-1
n-2

n-2

(a)

3

m-l

m-1

n-1

n-1

n-1
n-2

n-2

(b)

Figure 1.6. Positions o f symbols after applying g^gg ■■•g„g2

ggg^ •••g„g 2 g 3 -
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Case IL Properties o f the none-ordinary produet o f generators
Lemma 3: For the star graph with n -\ generators, the following holds:
= g a & g s ' ' ' g «g2g)

..............= ^ . ^ 2 ^ 3 ' ' '

Proof. When the first n-\ generators are applied, all the symbols will shift one step
cloekwise on the corresponding leaf, as in Fig. 1.6 (only presenting the first two cases
here, the remaining can be executed similarly). Then, when the last generator o f the
product is applied, the symbol 1 will return back to its original position (center), and we
obtain the same permutation \ n 2 3 - - - { n - 2 ) { n - \ ) for all the products listed above.
Q.E.D.
Corollary 3.1: For star graph with n -\ generators, the following does not hold:
& 2 & 3& 4

’ S n -\S n ~ S

î

S

aS s

' '

S nS l ~

............”

S n S lS ^

' S n -2 S n -\

Part o f the proving process for Lemma 3 has shown that symbols on the center vertex
in the star transposition tree are different before applying the last generator.
Corollary 3.1.2: The position o f each symbol in the ordinary cycle for the cycle
representation o f the source permutation is fixed, while eyelie shift operations on
symbols in a none-ordinary cycle are allowed.
Proof. Proof follows Corollary 3.1 since each symbol in the ordinary cycle corresponds
to a distinct generator in the star transposition tree. This concludes that the cyclic shift
operations on the symbols in an ordinary cycle are not allowable. Proof for the second
part is already shown in Lemma 3. Q.E.D.
Lemma 4: If some products o f generators in a star graph consists o f two subproduets of
distinct sets o f generators
then n„ =

= FI^ 0 * , and if either o f them is o f the none-ordinary type,

n * = r ii n „ •

15
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Proof. We can decompose the original star transposition tree into two substrees,
corresponding to distinct sets o f generators and connected through the center vertex. Let
us assume that symbol x ( x e {1,2,3, ••-, «} ) was in the center vertex before applying the
none-ordinary product. After applying the none-ordinary product, all symbols o f its
subtrees will be shifted one position clockwise on the leaves, and the symbol x will be
returned to the center vertex. Since sets o f generators in

and

are distinct, this

cannot affect any shifting o f symbols on the other subtree; therefore, the ordering o f two
subproducts (either ordinary or none-ordinary) is arbitrary. Q.E.D.
Lemma 5; The none-ordinary subproduct o f generators can be nested in other subproduct
consisting of a distinct set o f generators, whether it is o f ordinary or none-ordinary type.
P ro o f Since the none-ordinary subproduct preserves the symbol in the center vertex o f
the star transposition tree and its distinct generators will not affect any shifting of
symbols in the other subproduet, it can be nested in the other subproduet (whether it is of
ordinary or none-ordinary type) without affecting the resulted final permutation. Q.E.D.
The following example will illustrate the nesting o f subproduets and the
corresponding cycles:
rio = g4g5g3g6g3, = 8 3g6ë3ë 4 8 ^
= g4 g3g6g3

C, = (145)(36) = (14)(15)(13)(16)(13)
= (13)(16)(13)(14)(15) = (14)(13)(16)(13)(15)

The previous lemmas can be generalized to k subproducts o f distinct sets o f
generators by the following lemma.
Lemma 6: If some produet of generators in the star graph consists o f k subproducts
{ 2 < k < n ) o f distinct sets o f generators Il„ = n ,

and if at most one o f them is

16
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an ordinary one, then the ordering o f these subproducts is arbitrary, and the noneordinary ones can be nested in the ordinary subproduct or/and other none-ordinary ones.
Proof. Again we can divide a star transposition tree into k distinct subtrees connected
through the eenter vertex. Assume that symbol x ( x e |l,2 ,3 ,- - - ,« } ) was in the center
vertex before applying the none-ordinary products. Each none-ordinary subproduct will
only shift the symbols o f its subtree clockwisely on the corresponding leaves and return
the symbol x to the center vertex. The ordinary subproduct will only shift the symbols of
its subtree clockwisely on the corresponding leaves and replace the center vertex x with
the last symbol form its subtree. Since the generators in the ordinary subproduct and
none-ordinary ones are distinct, this cannot affect any shifting o f symbols on other
subtree, therefore the ordering o f them is arbitrary. Due to the distinct sets o f generators
in none-ordinary subproducts and the preserving o f the center symbol, they can be nested
in the ordinary subproduct or/and other none-ordinary ones. Q.E.D.
The following example explains the above lemma 6:
r i,
= g4 g3^6g3 g ; g7g»g7 =

g 4 g ; g3 g7g8& 7 ^6 ^3 =

" = ^4 ^5 ^3 ^6 g7g»g7 ^3

Corollary 6.1: If the cycle representation o f the source permutation is the product o f k
distinct cycles o f distinct symbols Q = QC2

Q , and if at most one o f them is an

ordinary one, then the ordering o f these cycles is arbitrary, and the none-ordinary cyeles
can be nested in the ordinary eycle or/and other none-ordinary ones.
Proof follows Lemma 6 and Corollary 4.1.
The following example explains the above Corollary 6.1 :

17
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C =45363787910119 = 45363910119787 = 45787910119363 = 45787363910119 =
= 43635787910119 = 45736387910119 = 45783637910119 = 45787936310119

=43637875910119 = ••• = 45936378710119

= 43637879101195

This example shows how large the number o f alternative optimal paths between two
arbitrary nodes can be in the star graph, even without taking into account all the cyclic
shifts on each symbol in the none-ordinary cycle. If we do not consider the nesting of
cycles and we assume all the cycles are o f the none-ordinary type, the number of
alternative optimal paths is

, where k is number o f cycles and pi denotes the

number o f distinct symbols in each cycle Q .
1.2.4

Routing

The routing between two nodes in the star graph is accomplished by sending the
message from the current node to the next node until the destination node is reached.
Since the star graph is vertex symmetric, with no loss o f generality, the destination node
is assumed to have been labeled as the Identity Permutation / = 123^ ^M , hence the
routing is equivalent to sorting the source permutation to the destination permutation.
Given the label o f the source node, there are two ways to specify the destination node.
One way is to use the label o f the destination node. The second way is to exploit the fact
that in the star graph one label is simply a permutation on the digits o f the other label.
But, since any permutation can be viewed as a set o f cycles, i.e., cyclically order sets of
digits with the property that each digit’s desired position is that occupied by the next digit

18
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in the set. Hence, after having the label o f the destination node fixed to /, to specify the
source node is to exploit the fact that the label, u, the source permutation, is simply a
permutation on the digits o f I. Routing between two given nodes is accomplished based
on the following two rules [4]:
i)

If 1 is the leftmost digit, move it to any position not occupied by the correct digit;

ii) If i is the leftmost digit { \ < i < n ) , move it to its correct position.
It was shown that these two rules [4] ensure an optimal path o f the minimum
distance:

f

0 , if 1 is first in the source permutation
distance - c + m~<
[ 2 , if 1 is not first in the source permutation

where c denotes the number o f cycles o f length greater than 2 , and m is the total number
o f symbols in these cycles, namely misplaced symbols. Next section continues to
introduce the node-disjoint paths in the star graph.
1.2.5

Node-disjoint paths

A path originating from a node can be uniquely specified by the labels o f links it
traverses. The length o f a path is the number o f links it traversed. A path is operational if
it passes through fault-free intermediary nodes and links. Two or more paths are nodedisjoint if, except for the source and destination nodes, they do not have any node in
common. It is important to have node-disjoint (or parallel) paths between two nodes in an
interconnection network to speed up the transfer o f a large amount o f data and provide
alternative routes in the case o f node failures.
The maximum number o f node-disjoint paths o f the shortest length between a given
pair of nodes in the star graph has been derived in [12] and is known to be “n -I”. The
notation n{i) is used to refer to the

digit o f the label o f u. If the node permutation o f u,
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expressed in its cyclic form, then it follows:
i)

If ;t(I) = 1, there are n-\ node-disjoint paths between u and I as follows:
a) m paths o f the shortest length c+m
b) n-m -\ paths o f length c+m+2

ii) If ^(1) ^ I , there are n-\ node-disjoint paths between u and I as follows:
a) c paths o f the shortest length c+m-2
b) m -c-\ paths o f length c+m, and
e) n-m paths o f length c+m+2
The above results are very important as we shall make the extensive use o f them in
Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation. For the purpose o f simplicity, we use r to denote the
shortest distance between u and / in the rest o f this paper.
1.2.6

Antipodes

A Dimension Permutation (DP) 5 is a permutation on the set o f dimensions of the
network (or equivalently a permutation on the digits o f the label o f each node in the
network). The D P is a bijection which assigns uniquely to any given node, a specific
node in the network. The first node can be thought o f as the source and the second node
as the destination. A DP 5 can be specified by a set o f cycles which maps the source to
the destination. This set o f cycles will be equivalent to the cycle representation o f the
source node label if the destination node is /.
In a network, the farthest node(s) from a given node along the shortest path is called
the node’s antipode(s) [22]. The antipode o f a node is apart from it by

(diameter o f the

star network) and can be specified by a maximum permutation ( ^ ^ ). More specifically,
in

with digit I in place, all cycles must be o f length 2 for odd n. For even n, there
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may be two possibilities. There there may be one eyele o f length 3 and the rest o f length
2 (again, digit 1 must be in place); or M/2 2-eyele with one eyele containing digit 1.
Details are explained in [22] as follows:
a) When n is odd, all cycles o f
we
c

must be o f length 2 with digit 1 in place. Then

)(iJs) " ( L i l ), where l<i^,

have

n.

And

m =n - l

and

= (m - 1 ) / 2 .

b) When n is even, there are two possibilities. First, there is one cycle o f length 3
and

the

rest

o f length

2

(digit

1 must be

in place),

^max = (1)(4Ÿ'4)(V'6) " ( L ,C ) , where 1 < 4 , zj,--, /„ < n.
Second, there are

m /2

And m =

therefore
m -1

and c =

we

have

(m -2 )/2 .

2-cycles with one eycle containing digit I, therefore we have

<^max = (44)(V'4 )(4 4 ) "

) , where 1 <

zj,--, z„ < n.

And

am = m

and c =

m /2.

As an example, in a 5-star, one o f the antipodes o f a node can be specified by the
following permutation: ^
For a
example,

6

= (1)(23)(45).

-star, there are two possibilities to specify the antipodes o f a node. For
can be in forms of: (1)(234)(56) or (12)(34)(56) .

In S„, there exist more than one way to construct cycles so that a

can be

obtained. Two cases are distinguished to find the number o f antipodes for a given node in
a& [22]:
Case (i): n is odd. Then 5^^^ = (l)(4 4 )(4 4 )“ ‘(4-i4) ’ where l<Z 2 ,zj,-",z^ < n . Note that
the order in which the cycles appear does not change the antipode. The number o f distinct
cycles of which 2 is a member (i.e., 23, 24, •••,

2m)

is

(m -2 ).

After selecting the pair for
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the first 2-cycle, there are (m-3) digits left. The number o f distinct 2-cycles o f which a
given digit, say 4, is a member is (m-4), and so on. It follows that the number o f antipodes
for a given node in this case is

= { n - 2){n - 4)(m - 6 ) •••I .

Case (ii)-. n is even. Depending on

we consider two possibilities. First, let

^max = (l)(4 4 4 )(4 4 )" '(4 -i4 ) • Using a similar argument as in Case (i) the number o f

antipodes for a given node here is given by:

2

x

( m- 5)(m- 7) •••1 (The factor o f 2
v3

y

is due to the fact that 3 elements x, y, and z can form two distinct 2-cyclces). Second, let
^max = (4 4 )(4 4 )(4 4 )' ' ' (4-i4) • The number o f antipodes

corresponding

to this

permutation is: { n - \){n - 3)(m - 5) •••I . Summing the number o f antipodes gives

= (» - !)(» - 3)(» - 5) -1+ 2 X
v3

( m- 5 ) ( m-7 )---1 .
y

Since the number of antipodes is more than one (for «>3), we define the antipode
corresponding to the following D P's as the basic antipode.
^max = (1)(23)(45) •••(m -1 , n),

for odd n;

<^max = (I)(234)(56) •••(m -1 , n),

for even n

or(I2)(23)(45) -(M-I,M)
As an example, in a 5-star, there exists 3 antipodes for each node which can be
reached from that node by applying the following permutations:
^maxi = (1)(23)(45)

(basic antipode)

^ m «2= (lX 24)(35)

,y _ , = (I)(25)(34)
However, there is only one unique antipode for a given node in the hypercube
network. This antipode is in distance n away from the given node, and its binary string
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representation is the complement o f the label o f the given node. This brings new
requirements that communications between a given node and its antipodes in the star
graph needs to be investigated extensively before applications.
1.2.7

Decomposition

Each S„ contains n disjoint 5„_i’s. Partitioning a S„ can be done in (m-1) different
ways. This is implemented by removing the set of z-links, 2 < i < n , every time. For
example, partitioning S 4 along the 4-link will result in [ X X X 4 ,X X X 3 ,X X X 2 ,X X X l] ,
while partitioning S 4 along the i-lin k will result in { ^ X X 4 X , X X ' 3 X , X X 2 X , X X I X ] ,
partitioning S4 along the 2-link will result in [ X 4 X X , X 3 X X , X 2 X X , X I X X ] . Fig. 3
illustrates a S 4 where the mentioned substars Ss's are shown as hexagons. Partitioning S„
along dimension “ 1” will result in n! isolated nodes. This is the only case where
partitioning does not produce

S„ is

AM!, for

1

“ m” 5 „ - i ’ s .

It follows that the number o f disjoint S„.m's in a

< AM< A7 , whereas the number o f distinct

is

AM!

^AM y ^AMy

Each substar can be uniquely labeled as a string o f symbols over the set
|I,2,3,---,m-1,m,X} , where A is a D on’t Care symbol. A service o f 2Ts in the label o f a

substar implies all permutations on the digits not appearing in the label. The first position
(i.e. the leftmost one) o f the label o f any substar always equals to X because o f the
connectivity conditions o f the star graph, unless the substar is a single node (i.e. So).
Notably, the number o f X symbols in the string determines the dimension o f the substar.
Specifically, an w-dimensional substar, Sm, has exactly m X s

in its symbol
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representation, as it involves a group o f m\ nodes. For example, X 2 X I X , represents a 3star formed by the set o f nodes |2 3 4 15,23514,43512,43215,53214,53412}.
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CHAPTER 2

RELIABILITY AND EVALUATION
A fault-tolerant network is one that can continue to correctly perform its specified
tasks in the presence o f failures which could be in forms o f node failures, link failures, or
combined node/link failures. The most prominent requirements to achieve a fault-tolerant
network are reliability, availability, safety, performability, dependability, maintainability,
and testability.
As the size o f a system grows, the probability o f a fault occurring in the network
increases. It is important to quantify the effect o f the faults, so the fault-tolerant network
can be pursued. Normally, reliability is used to evaluate a multiprocessor interconnection
network. The reliability R{t) o f a system [1] is a function o f time, defined as the
conditional probability that the system will perform correctly throughout
that the system was performing correctly at time

given

. In other words, the reliability is the

probability that the system will operate correctly throughout a complete interval o f time.
The unreliability R{t) o f a system is a function o f time, defined as the conditional
probability that the system will perform incorrectly throughout
system was performing correctly at time

, given that the

[2]. The unreliability is often referred to as

the probability o f failure. Fault tolerance is a technique that can improve reliability, but a
fault-tolerant system does not necessarily have a high reliability. In other words, the
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system ean achieve a high reliability but not possess attributes o f the fault tolerance.
Before we introduce different reliability measures and reliability evaluation models, a
brief description about some fundamental terms is given first.

2.1

Fault, error, and failure

Three fundamental terms in the fault-tolerant design are fault, error, and failure [6 ].
There is a cause-and-effect relationship between faults, errors, and failure. Specifically,
faults are the causes of errors, and errors are the cause o f failures.
A fa u lt is a physical defect, imperfection, or flaw that occurs within some hardware or
software components. Essentially, the definition o f a fault, as used in the fault tolerance
community, agrees with the definition found in the dictionary. A fault is a blemish,
weakness, or shortcoming o f a particular hardware or software component. Examples of
faults include shorts between electrical conductors, open or breaks in conductors, or
physical flaws or imperfections in semiconductor devices. Similarly, in software, an
example o f a fault is a program loop that when entered can never be exited.
An error is the manifestation o f a fault. Specifically, an error is a deviation from
accuracy or correctness. For example, suppose that a physical short results in a line
within a circuit being permanently stuck at logic 1. The physical short is a fault within the
circuit. If some condition occurs that requires the line to transition to logic 0, the value on
the line will be in error. In other words, the correct value for the line will be logic 0 , but
the existence o f the fault has caused the line to have an erroneous value. In other words,
an error is the result o f a fault.
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Finally, if the error results in the system performing one o f its functions incorrectly, a
system failure has occurred. Essentially, a failure is the non-performance o f some action
that is due or expected. A failure is also the performance o f some function in a subnormal
quantity or quality. As an example, suppose that a line in a circuit is responsible for
turning a value on or off: logic

1

turns the value on and logic

0

turns the value off. If the

line is stuck at logic 1, the value is stuck on. As long as the user o f the system wants the
system the value one, the system will be functioning correctly. However, when the user
wants to turn the value off, the system will experience a failure.
Fig. 2.1 illustrates the cause-and-effect relationship between faults, errors, and
failures. Faults result in errors, and errors ean lead to system failures. One way to think of
Fig. 2,1 is as a hierarchy. At the bottom o f the hierarchy are faults. Errors are the effect o f
faults, and finally, failures are the effect o f errors.

Fault

Error

Failure

Figure 2.1. Relationship between faults, errors, and failures.

Faults can be the results o f a variety o f things that occur within electronic
components, external to the components, or during the component or system design
process, ft is very important to understand all the possible causes o f faults. Possible fault
causes

can be

associated

with

problems

in

four basic

areas:

specifications,

implementation, components, and external factors. The first cause o f faults is the
possibility o f specification mistakes, including incorrect algorithms, architectures, or
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hardware and software design spécifications. The next cause o f faults is implementation
mistakes, defined as faults during the process o f transforming hardware and software
specifications into the physical hardware and the actual software. The next cause is
component defects, defined as manufacturing imperfections, random device defects, and
component wear-out, etc. The final cause o f faults is the external disturbance, for
example, radiation, electromagnetic interference, battle damage, operator mistakes, and
environmental extremes.
To adequately describe faults, however, characteristics other than the causes are
required. In addition to the causes, four major attributes are critical to the description o f
faults; nature, duration, extent, and value.
The fault nature specifies the type o f faults. This can specified using terms such as
hardware, software, analog, and digital. The fault duration specifies that length o f time
that a fault is active. And this could be permanent, transient, or intermittent. The fault
extent whether the fault is localized to a given hardware or software or whether it
globally affects the hardware, the software, or both. The fault value ean either
determinate or indeterminate. A determinate fault is one whose status remains unchanged
throughout time unless externally aeted upon. Meanwhile, an indeterminate fault is one
whose status at some time T may be different from its status at some other time T ’.

2.2

Quantitative evaluation methods

The methods for evaluating fault-tolerant networks can be divided into two major
categories; quantitative and qualitative. Qualitative measures are typically subjective in
nature and describe the benefits o f one network over another. Quantitative evaluation
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techniques produce numbers that can be used to compare two or more systems. Usually
we discuss methods o f evaluation that generate speeific numbers to compare two or more
systems. Often, we find that certain attributes o f a system that enter the design process
are extremely difficult to quantity. And in practice, major decisions are often using more
qualitative information than quantitative. These qualitative comparisons are flexibility,
technology dependence, transparency to the user, and testability. The flexibility o f a
system is referred as the ability to expand and improve as customer needs change and
technological advance occur. Technology dependence is easy to understand as the ability
o f the system capable o f adapting itself to the new developed technology. Easy to
understand, to operate, to test the system are also important concerns for qualitatively
evaluating a fault-tolerant network. However, these qualitative evaluations are extremely
difficult to determine and out of the scope o f this dissertation. Therefore, we only stick to
the quantitative evaluation techniques throughout the dissertation.
The purpose o f quantitative evaluation is to assign a number to some attribute o f a
system such that this attribute can be compared among systems. For example, the
reliability o f one system may be greater than that of another. Next we introduce several
quantitative evaluation techniques [6 ] , including the failure rate, reliability, mean time to
failure (MTTF), mean time to repair (MTTR), mean time between failures (MTBF),.
•

Failure rate and reliability function
Intuitively, failure rate is the expected number o f failures o f a type o f device or

system p er a given time period. For example, if a computer fails, on the average, once
every

2 0 0 0

hours, the computer has a failure rate o f one failure per

2 0 0 0

hours, or

1 /2 0 0 0

failures/hour. The failure rate is typically denotes as À . The failure rate is one measure
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that can be used to compare systems or components. In selecting a banking application,
one would like to select a computer that fails as infrequently as possible.
The reliability R{t) o f a system is a function o f time, defined as the conditional
probability that the system will perform correctly throughout the interval

given

that the system was performing correctly at time t^ . Suppose that we test N identical
components by placing all N components in operation at time t^ and recording the
number o f failed and working components at time t . Let N flt) be the number o f
components that have failed at time t and N flt) be the number o f components that are
operating correctly at time t . It is assumed that once a component fails it remains failed
indefinitely. The reliability of the components at time t is given by
n /.\ _

Ff t ) _

Npit)

which is simply the probability that a component has survived the interval [tg,/]. The
probability that a component has not survived the time interval is called the unreliability
and is given by
^ / ( t ) _____

NJt)+Nf(t)

Note that at any time t, R{t) = 1 .0 - Q(t) because R{t) + Q(t) = ^

^

= 1 .0 .

If we rewrite the reliability function and differentiate R(t) with respect to time, we
obtain —

deri vat i ve o f N y ( t ) , dNj-(t )ldt , is simply the

instantaneous rate at which components are failing. At time t, there are still N f t )
components operational. Dividing d N f i t ) ! dt by N f t ) we obtain
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z{t) is called the hazard function, hazard rate, or failure rate function. The failure units
for the failure rate function are failures per unit o f time. The failure rate function can be
expressed in different ways. For example, z{t) can be written strictly in terms o f the
reliability function R{t) as

z(0-

J.T

dRjt)

(A

d R (t)
dt

Æ( 0 '

Similarly, z(t) can also be written in terms o f the unreliability Q{t) as
d R (t )

d t ) - __ ^

d Q (t)

^__

The derivative o f the unreliability dQ{t) / dt is called the failure density function.
If we assume that the system has a given constant failure rate À , the solution to the
above differential equation is well known to be an exponential function given by
R{t) =

. This exponential relationship between the reliability and time is known as the

exponential failure law, which states that for a constant failure rate function, the
reliability varies exponentially as a function o f time.
The exponential failure law is extremely valuable for the analysis o f electronic
components and is by far the most commonly used relationship between reliability and
time. Many cases, however, cannot assume that the failure rate function is constant, so
the exponential failure law cannot be used; other modeling schemes and representations
must be employed. An example o f the time-varying failure rate function is found in the
analysis o f software. Software failures are the result o f design faults, and as a software
package is used, design faults are discovered and corrected. Consequently, the reliability
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o f software should improve as a funetion o f time, and the failure funetion should
decrease.
A eommon modeling teehnique used to represent time-varying failure rate functions
is the Weilbull distribution. The failure rate function associated with the Weibull
distribution is given by z{t) = aÀ{Àty~^, where a and T are constants that control the
variation o f the failure rate function with time. The failure rate function given by the
Weibull distribution is intuitively appealing. For example, if the value o f a is 1, z{t) is
simply the constant T . If or is greater than I, z(t) inereases as time inereases; if a is
less than I, z{t) decreases as time inereases. Consequently, we ean envision modeling
software using the Weibull distribution with the constant a being less than I. The
reliability function that results from the Weibull distribution is given as R{t) =

.

Although time-varying failure rate functions are important in the analysis o f software
and other systems, by far the most common analysis is performed assuming a constant
failure rate function and the exponential failure law. Thus we continue to use the
exponential failure distribution for the remaining o f this dissertation.
•

Mean time to failure
In addition to the failure rate, the mean time to failure (MTTF) is a useful parameter

to specify the quality of a system. The MTTF is the expected time that a system will
operate before the first failure occurs. For example, if we have N identical system plaeed
into operation at time t = 0 , and we measure the time that each system operates before
failing, the average time is the MTTF. If each system i operates for a time t. before
encountering the first failure, the MTTF is given by M TTF = l . f Lf i / N .
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The MTTF can be calculated by finding the expected value o f the time o f failure.
From the probability theory, we know that the expected value o f a random variable X is
E[X~\

^ x f {x)dx , where / (x) is the probability density function. In reliability

analysis we are interested in the expected value o f the time o f failure (MTTF), so
MTTF =

if) d t, where / (t) is the failure density function, and the integral runs from

0 to CO because the failure density function is undefined for times less than 0. Using
integration by parts and the fact that / (t) = - d R ( t ) / d t , we can show that
MTTF = - ^ t ^ d t = [-tR{t) +

R{t)dt]; = JT R{t)dt

The term -tR {t) clearly disappears when t = 0 ; but, it also disappears when t = co
because i?(oo) = 0 . Consequently, the MTTF is defined in terms o f the reliability function
as MTTF =

R { t)d t, which is valid for any reliability function that satisfies i?(oo) = 0 .

If the reliability function obeys the exponential failure law, the result o f calculating the
MTTF is given by M TTF = JT e~^'dt = y . In other words, the MTTF o f a system that
obeys the exponential failure law is the inverse o f the failure rate o f the system.
•

Mean time to repair
The mean time to repair (MTTR) is simply the average time required to repair a

system. The MTTR is extremely difficult to estimate and is often determined
experimentally by injecting a set o f faults, one at a time, into a system and measuring the
time required to repair the system in each case. The measured repair times are averaged
to determine an average time to repair. The MTTR is normally specified in terms o f a
repair rate p , which is the average number o f repairs that occur per time period. The

37

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

units o f the repair rate are normally the number o f repairs per hour. The MTTR and the
repair rate p are related by MTTR — 1
•

Mean time between failure
The mean time between failures (MTBF) is the average time between failures o f a

system. If we assume that all repairs to a system make the system perfect once again until
it was when it was new, the relationship between the MTTF and the MTBF is as
illustrated in Fig. 2.2. Once successfully placed into operation, a system operates, on the
average, a time corresponding to the MTTF before encountering the first failure. The
system then requires some time, MTTR, to repair the system and place it back into
operation once again. The system then is perfect once again and will operate for a time
corresponding to the MTTF before encountering its next failure. The time between the
two failures is the sum o f MTTF and MTTR and is the MTBF. Thus, the difference
between the MTTF and the MTBF is the MTTR. Specifically, the MTBF is given by
MTBT = MTTF + MTTR. In most practical applications the MTTR is a small fraction o f
the MTTF, so the approximation that the MTBF and MTTF are equal is often quite good.

MTBF = MTTF + MTTR

MTTF

MTTF

-s
MTTR
T im e of first failure

c
T im e

MTTR
T im e of s e c o n d failure

Figure 2.2. Relationship between the MTBF, MTBR, and MTTF.

2.3 Performance measures
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An undirected network G = ( V, E) is usually modeled as either a deterministic
network or a probabilistic network [8 ], In deterministic networks it is considered that
working elements can be sueeessfully attaehed by an adversary, resulting in their failure
or inactivation. The failure o f an edge means that it is removed from the network, while
the failure of a node means that the node and all its incident edges are removed from the
network. In deterministic network models the focus is typically on evaluating the worstcase performance o f the network, in whieh the adversary intelligently ehoose eertain
elements to inactivate, resulting in the maximum damage to the network. This type o f
model thus provides a conservative assessment o f performance, and it would be
particularly appropriate in the design o f robust military systems.
By contrast, in probabilistic networks it is usually assumed that, at any instant,
elements fail randomly and independently o f one another, according to certain known
probabilities. Specifieally, each node i has an associated reliability pi indicating the
probability that it is operational, and each edge / has a reliability p i , the probability that
it is operational. Thus, at any instant the elements o f the network fail independently with
probabilities ^/ = I - Pi and q i = \ - Pi, respeetively. In these circumstances, one would
be interested in assessing the average performance o f the network under the random
failures. Thus, unless announced, most o f our reliability analyses are based on the
probabilistic network models.
For the case o f probabilistic networks (in which nodes/links fail randomly and
independently with known probabilities), a number o f measures have been explored.
Suppose G is directly, with j- and t being two distinguished nodes o f G. A traditional
measure o f the reliability evaluation is the terminal reliability [8][9][I0], such as two-
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terminal reliability, distance reliability, ^-terminal reliability, and all terminal reliability.
The two-terminal reliability R^tiG) is the probability that s and t are connected by a path
o f operating edges and nodes in G. The distance reliability (DR) is the probability of
having an operational path with the shortest distance between two given arbitrary nodes s
and t. The source-to-all-terminal reliability R{G) is the probability that there is an
operative path from node s' to all other nodes o f the network. The all-terminal reliability
would be an appropriate measure when all nodes are o f equal importance in receiving a
message sent from the source node, whereas the two-terminal reliability would apply
when a critical message needs to be routed between specified sites in the network. The
distance reliability is especially designed to achieve the efficient communication by only
considering the message passing thought those paths o f the shortest distance between two
given arbitrary nodes

5

and t. A generalization o f these concepts is embodied in the

source-to-K-terminal reliability o f the network, the probability RjçiG) that there is an
operative path from node

5

to all nodes in some specified set K œ N . These probabilistic

measures have analogous counterparts in the case where G is undirected. Notice that for
undirected networks the all-terminal reliability simply expresses the probability that G
remains connected.
One interesting measure is the task-based reliability [5], defined as the probability
that some minimum number o f connected nodes are available in the system for the
specific task execution. This task-based reliability is based on the assumption that a
system works as long as there is a group o f connected working nodes for satisfying the
task requirement. However, this measure is extremely difficult to model exactly.
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An alternative probabilistic measure takes into account the fact that different ways of
disconnecting a network are o f different severity. For example, if G is undirected and
connected, then the failure o f certain edges and nodes could separate G into several
connected components,

, G2 ,

. All communication is then disrupted between

nodes in different components, and the resulting communication capacity can be

measured by the number o f pairs o f node able to communicate: É
, where tii is the
/=! v 2 y
number o f nodes in the component G; . The average number o f node pairs able to
communicate, taken over all possible nodes and edge failures, thus provides a quite
different type o f the probabilistic measure, the pair-connectivity o f G [1].
In Chapter I, we mentioned some symmetric hierarchical networks have the recursive
decomposition property, which means that an «-dimensional symmetric network can be
recursively decomposed into smaller size networks with the same topological properties
as the original one. Bhuyan [4] proposed a new idea o f subcube reliability, defined as the
probability that a subcube of a specific size is available in the system. Since the star
network is strongly hierarchical as the hypereube, it is wise to explore the substar
reliability in the star interconnection network. A similar idea with the aim o f finding the
minimum number o f failed nodes or links to destroy all available substars has been
studied and reported in [7]. Among these reliability measures, the subnetwork reliability
is the most practical one because a user in the current multiprocessor network is given a
specific subnetwork for the execution o f his/her program.

2.4 Reliability modeling methods
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Reliability is one o f the most important attributes o f systems. Almost all
spécifications for systems mandate that certain values for reliability be achieved and in
some way proved. We have seen in Section 2.1 that reliability can be determined
experimentally if a set o f N system is operated over a period o f time and the number o f
systems that fail during that time period is recorded. One problem with the experimental
approach is the number o f systems that would be required to achieve a level o f confidence
in the experimental results. This is particularly a problem when costs limit the number of
systems that can be built. For example, the space shuttle program could not afford to
build

1 0 0 0

o f its on-board processing systems that reliability could be experimentally

verified. A second problem with the experimental approach is the time required to run
such experiments. Many systems today are being designed to achieve reliability o f 0.9^,
or higher, after ten hours of operation. Using the exponential failure law, a reliability of
0.9^ corresponds to a failure rate o f

10

“* failures per hour. Therefore, on the average, we

would have to wait approximately 100 million hours, or approximately 11,416 years for
the first failure to occur. Clearly, we need alternatives to the experimental approach.
The most popular reliability analysis techniques are the analytical approaches. O f the
analytical technique, combinatorial modeling and Markov modeling [2][3] [6 ][ 8 ] are the
two most commonly used approaches.
2.4.1

Combinatorial model

Combinatorial models use probabilistic techniques that enumerate the different ways
in which a system can remain operational. The probabilities o f the events that lead to a
system being operational are calculated to form an estimate o f the system’s reliability.
The reliability o f a system is generally derived in terms o f reliabilities o f the individual
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components of the system. Two models that are most common in practice are the series
and the parallel. In a series system, each element is required to operate correctly for the
system to operate correctly. In a parallel system, on the other hard, only one o f several
elements must be operational for the system to perform its functions correctly. In
practice, systems are typically combinations o f series and parallel subsystems.
a.

Series systems

The series system is best thought o f as a system that contains no redundancy; that is,
each element of the system is needed to make the system function correctly. One way o f
representing the series system is by the aid o f reliability block diagrams. The reliability
block diagram can be thought o f a flow diagram from the input o f the system to the
output o f the system. Each element o f the system is a block in the diagram and, for the
series system, the blocks are placed in series to indicate that a path from the input to the
output is broken if one o f elements fails.

Component

Component

Component

Figure 2.3. The reliability block diagram o f a series system.

The generalized reliability block diagram o f a series system that contains N elements
is shown in Fig. 2.3. Each o f the N elements is required for the system to function
correctly. The reliability o f the series system can be calculated as the probability that
none o f the elements will fail. Another way to look at this is that the reliability o f the
series system is the probability that all o f the elements are working properly.
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Suppose we let C.^{t) represent the event that component C. is working properly at
time t, R.{t) is the reliability of component C,. at time t, and

is the reliability o f

the series system. Further suppose that the series system contains N series components as
shown in Fig. 9. The reliability at any time t is the probability that all N components are
working properly. In mathematical terms,

(0 = ^
Assuming that each event,

^

C2^(f) n ---n

, is independent, we have

^series ( 0 = ^1 (0-^2 ( 0 ' ' '

( 0 or Rggries ( 0 = H i?/ { t)
i~\

An interesting relationship exists in a series system if each individual component
satisfies the exponential failure law such that the reliability o f each component is
Ri{t) =

. Suppose that we have a series system made up o f N components, and each

component / has a constant failure rate À.. The reliability o f the series system is given by

where k^y^tem =

and corresponds to the failure rate o f the system. In other words, the

failure rate o f a series system can be calculated by adding the failure rates o f all the
components that make up the series system. Thus, the value o f the MTTF in the series
system assuming that each component satisfies the exponential failure law can be
series

b.

I

yyv i. '

Parallel systems

The basic feature o f the parallel system is that only one of N elements is required for
the system to function. The reliability block diagram o f the basic parallel system that
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contains N elements is shown in Fig.2.4. As ean be seen, a path exists in the reliability
block diagram from input to output as long as one o f the N elements remains operational.
The unreliability o f the parallel system can be computed as the probability that all o f the
N elements fail at the same time. Suppose that we let C^(t) represent the event that
component i has failed at time t, Qi(t) be the unreliability o f the
QparaiieA^)

element, and

the Unreliability o f the parallel system. Qp^raiteiiO can be computed as

Qparallel ( 0 = ^ ( Q /

( 0

is independent, we have

^ 2 ^ (t) H •••n

(t)), or if we assume that each event,

N
(t) = Q (t)Q^(()■■■ Qn ( 0 = I T

0

( 0

,

(0 ■

i=l

C om p onent
1

C om p onent
2

•

C om p onent

N

Figure 2.4. The reliability block diagram o f the parallel system.

The reliability o f the parallel system can now be computed because we know that the
reliability and the unreliability must add to 1.0. Mathematically, we must have
R{t) + Q{t) = 1.0 for any system. Consequently, we ean write

^parallel ( 0 = 1“ Qparallel ( 0 = 1 -0 - f l 0 / ( 0 = 1 -0 “ O (1 -0 - /?/ (t)) .
i=\
/=!
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If each component i in the parallel system has a constant failure rate o f A,, also
assume that eaeh component satisfies the exponential failure law such that the reliability
o f each component is Ri(t) =

. The reliability o f the parallel system is given by

= 1 0 - g (l.O-jg^O) = 1 0 - g (1.0-e

i*j*k
where

^U =l

-

A=l Xi+Xj+X^ +••• + ( - 1 )

^

and

corresponds to the failure rate o f the parallel system. Thus, the value o f the MTTF in the
parallel system assuming that each component satisfies the exponential failure law ean be
obtained as
e.

=1/

•

Series-parallel or parallel-series system

The series and parallel systems discussed in the previous sections form the basis for
the analysis o f more complex configurations. The general principle used is to reduce
sequentially the complex eonfiguration by combining appropriate series and parallel
braches o f the reliability model until a single equivalent element remains. This equivalent
element then represents the reliability o f the original eonfiguration.
d.

r-out-of-iV systems

r-our-of-7V systems are a generalization o f the ideal parallel system. In the ideal
parallel system, only one o f N modules is required to work for the system to work. In
the r-out-of-A system, however, at least r o f the total o f N identical modules are
required to function for the system to function properly, and the system can tolerate at
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most N - r module failures. The expression for the reliability o f an r-out-of-A system
ean be written as (assuming each module has the same reliability R)
N

R r-o u t-o f-N (0 = Z

V 1/?' (1 V- y

N\

, where
y

Reliability evaluation teehniques described so far are limited in their applications to
networks having a series or parallel type o f structures. Many systems either do not have
this simple type o f strueture or have eomplex operational logic. Additional modeling and
evaluation techniques are neeessary in order to determine the reliability o f such systems.
Most o f these more advanced techniques are formalized methods for transforming the
logic operation o f the system, or the topology o f the system, into a strueture that consists
only of series and parallel components, paths or braches. Next we continue to introduce
techniques used for the reliability analysis in complex systems.
e.

Conditional probability approach

One approach which can be used to evaluate the reliability o f a complex system is to
reduce sequentially the system into subsystems structures that are connected in
series/parallel and then to recombine these subsystems using the conditional probability
method. The reliability under this approach can use the following equation
P(system success) = P(system success if component X is good) •P (X is good)
+ /"(system success if component X is bad) •P (X is bad)
The conditional probability approach is efficient to solve the bridge-type network in
Fig. 2.5. However, in some engineering systems further subdivision before a
series/parallel structure is needed. This is only an extension o f the technique being
discussed since each time a subdivision is made; the two subdivisions must recombined
using the conditional probability approach starting with the two most recent subdivided
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subsystems, i.e., the lowest hierarehieal level. After creating a set o f subsystems in which
all components are connected in series and parallel, the subsystems ean be evaluated
using the principles of series and parallel systems discussed before and the overall system
reliability evaluated using the conditional reliability approach. The conditional
probability approach is a useful tool for reliability evaluation and is frequently used in
many applications.

Figure 2.5. Example o f a bridge-type network,

f.

Minpaths; inclusion and exclusion

In the case o f the two terminal reliability, minpaths [2] are paths with the minimum
traveled links between the source node and the destination node. Suppose then that the
minpaths

o f a given graph G have been listed. Let Ei be the event that

minpath P, is operational, and let Pr[ ] denotes the reliability o f an event. Then the
reliability is just the probability that one (or more) o f the events { p j occurs.
Unfortunately, the {P,} s are not disjoint events, and hence we cannot simply sum their
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probabilities
P r[/'j and

o f occurrence.

To be

specific, P r[£ ’j orP^]

] - Now Re7(G) = Pr[P, or

or -- or

R e/(G )= I (-iy + 1

is P r[£ ’j] + P r[ii 2 ] -

, and hence

I

[Ej].

y=l

\l\=j

where P / is the event that all paths Pj with i e / are operational. This is a standard
inclusion-exclusion expansion.
g.

Using minpaths: disjoint produets

Let us once again suppose that we have an enumeration P^,P^,---,P^ o f the minpaths,
and let E. be the event that all nodes/edges in minpath

are operational. As we have

remarked, the events { p j are not disjoint; we pursue the strategy here o f forming a set o f
disjoint events. Let E. denotes the complement o f event P,. ; now define the event
Di - E l, and in general, D. = E \r \E i n -- -n P /-i n P . . The events D. are disjoint, and
hence are often called “disjoint product ” events. Moreover, we ean get the reliability as a
Boolean expression as follows (we use (+) to denote “or”, and times (■) or simply
concatenation to represent “and”);
R e/(G )= Z P r[D ;]
i~\
= P r\E i] + P r[æ'iP'2 ] + P r [ P 1 P 2 P 3 J + •••+ P r^ E \E 2 •••E h -\E ^ j
In employing this approach, one must obtain a formula for Pr[Z)/] in terms o f the
states of the nodes/edges. Each event E. can be written as a Boolean expression whieh is
the product of the states o f the nodes/edges in the minpath E . Hence D ean also be
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written as a Boolean expression. For this reason, methods using disjoint products are
sometimes called “Boolean algebra” methods.
h.

Cut set method

The cut set method is a powerful one for evaluating the reliability o f a system for two
main reasons:
(i) It can be easily programmed on a digital computer for the fast and effieient solution
of any general network.
(ii) The cut sets are directly related to the modes o f system failure and therefore identify
the distinct and discrete ways in which a system may fail.
A cut set can be defined as follows: A cut set is a set o f system components which,
when failed, causes failure o f the system. In terms o f a reliability network or block
diagram, the above definition can be interpreted as a set o f components whieh must fail in
order to disrupt all paths between the input and the output of the reliability network.
The minimum subset o f any given set o f components which causes the system failure
is known as a minimal cut set, defined as follows: A minimal cut set is a set o f system
components which, when failed, causes failure o f the system but when any one component
o f the set has not failed, does not cause the system failure. This definition means that all
components o f a minimal eut set must be in the failure state to cause the system failure.
In order to evaluate the system reliability (or unreliability), the minimal cut sets
identified from the reliability network must be combined. From the definition o f the
minimal cut sets it is evident that all components o f each cut must fail in order for the
system to fail. Consequently, the components o f the cut set are effectively connected in
parallel and the failure probabilities o f the components in the cut set may be combined
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using the principles o f parallel systems. In addition, the system fails if any one o f the cut
sets occurs and consequently each cut is effectively in series with all the other cuts.

Ci

Cn

C2

Figure 2.6. Reliability diagram using the minimum cut set.

The use o f this principle gives the reliability diagram (Figure 2.6) for ageneral
network. Although these cut sets are in series, the concept

o f series system cannot be

used because the same component may appear in two or more o f the cut sets. The concept
o f union does apply however and if the

cut is designed as Q and its probability of

occurrence is designated as P ( Q ) , then the unreliability of the system is given by
Ô5 = - P ( Q

^ 2 u C3 U • • • U Cj u • • • u C „ )

= Z P (Q ) - z P (Q n Cy) + ... + (-1 )"-^P (Q n C2 n - -- n Q )
i=i
i,j=\

i.

Tie set method

The tie set method is essentially the complement o f the cut set method. It is used less
frequently, in practice, as it does not directly identify the failure modes o f the system. A
tie set is a minimal path o f the system and is therefore a set o f system components
connected in series. Consequently, a tie set fails if any one o f the components in it fails
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and this probability can be evaluated using the principle o f series system. For the system
to fail, however, all o f the tie sets must fail and therefore all tie sets are effectively
connected in parallel. A tie set diagram using these concepts is presented in Fig. 2.7.

Figure 2.7. Reliability diagram using the tie set method.

Although the tie sets are in parallel, the concept o f parallel systems cannot be used
because the same component can appear in two or more o f the tie sets. The concept o f
union does apply however in a similar manner to that discussed for minimal cut sets.
Then the reliability o f the system is given as follows:
v j ■■- KjTyj^

= P ( T j W 72 ^ ? 3 u " - w

= Z P ( 7 ;) - Z P (? ;n 7 \.)+
i=\

. + ( - l) " - ^ P ( 7 jn 7 ^ n ...n ? ;;) -

i ,j =\

t^ j

2.3.2

Markov model

The primary difficulty with the combinatorial models is that many complex systems
cannot be modeled easily in a combinatorial fashion. The reliability block diagrams can
be extremely difficult to construct, and the resulting reliability expressions are often very
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complex. In addition, the process o f repair that occurs in many systems is very difficult to
model in a eombinatorial fashion. For these reasons, we use Markov models.
The two main concepts in the Markov model are the system state and the state
transition. The state o f a system represents all that must be known to describe the system
at any given instant o f time. For reliability models, eaeh state o f the Markov model
represents a distinct combination of faulty and fault-free modules. For example, suppose
we have a TMR system with three identical computers in a majority voting arrangement
with a perfect voter. We can define the state o f this system as S = ( 8 ^,8 2 , S^) where
8 . =1 if module i is fault free and 8 ^ = 0 if module i is faulty. The TMR system has

eight distinct states in whieh it can operate: ( 0 0 0 ), ( 0 0 1 ), ( 0 1 0 ), ( 0

1 1

), ( 1 0 0 ), ( 1 0 1 ), ( 1 1 0 ),

and (111). Each state represents a unique combination o f faulty and fault-free modules
within the system. For TMR, we know that at least two o f the modules must be fault free
for the system to operate correctly. Therefore, the states (000), (001), (010), and, (100)
represent states in which the system has ceased to function correctly. The remaining
states are those in which the system is functioning correctly.
The state transitions govern the changes o f state that occur within a system. As time
passes and failures and reconfigurations occur, the system goes from one state to another.
For example, if the TMR system starts its operation in state (111) and at some time t
module I fails, the system transitions to state (110) . The state transitions are
characterized by probabilities such as the probability o f failure and repair.
We use TMR example to study the state transitions. We construct the TMR
transitions using following assumptions. First, we assume that the system does not
contain repair. In another word, once a module has failed, it remains failed permanently.

53

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Second, we assume that that only one failure will occur at a time. In a TMR system, the
single failure assumption implied that the system cannot go directly from the state
corresponding to all modules operating correctly to a state that corresponds to the system
having failed. Finally, we assume that the system starts in the perfect state (111) where
all o f the system’s modules are operating correctly.

1—ÀA/

l-2ÂAt

p erfect sta te

110

W 100

101

W 001

oil

W 010

W 000

tw o m o d u le s
fa ile d

o n e m o d u le s
fa ile d
V.

th r e e m o d u le s
fa ile d
V

y

s y s t e m fa ile d

Figure 2.8. Markov model o f the TMR system.

The state diagram is shown in Fig. 2.8. As can be seen the system begins in state
(111) and, upon the first module failure, transitions to state (110), (101), or (O il),
depending on whether module 1, 2, or 3 is the module that fails. Note that the transition
exists for the module to remain in a state if a module failure does not occur. The states
can be partitioned into three categories: the perfect state ( 1 1 1 ) where all modules
function correctly; the one-failed states (110),(101), and (Oil) where a single module

54

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

has failed, and the system-failed states ( 1 0 0 ), ( 0 0 1 ), ( 0 1 0 ), and ( 0 0 0 ) , in which certain
modules have failed to cause the system to fail.
Each state transition has associated with a transition probability that describes the
probability o f that state transition oceurring within a specified period o f time. If we
assume that each module in the TMR system obeys the exponential failure law and has a
constant failure rate o f À , the probability o f a modular being failed at some time t + A t,
given that the module was operational at time t , is given by (for small value o f A t)
X ÀAt . In other words, the probability that a module will fail within At is
approximately XAt . The state transition probability can now be specified for each
possible state transition.

1

Figure 2.9. Reduced Markov model o f the TMR system with a minimal number o f states.

It is possible to reduce the Markov model o f Fig. 2.8. If we appropriately define the
state transition probabilities, several states within the TMR model can be combined.
Suppose we let state 3 correspond to the state in which all three modules in the TMR
system are functioning correctly; state

2

is the state in which two modules are working

correctly; state F is the failed state in which two or more modules have failed. The
resulting Markov model can be illustrated as shown in Fig. 2.9. The state transition
probabilities shown in Fig. 2.9 have been derived to account for one o f several failure
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occurring. For example, the probability o f transitioning from state 3 to state 2 depends on
the probability o f any one o f three modules failing. Consequently, the transition
probability assigned to the transition from state 3 to state 2 is 2>ÀAt.
Equations for the Markov model o f the TMR system can be written easily from the
state diagram Fig.2.9. The probability o f the system being in any given state S at some
time Î + At depends on the probability that the system was in a state from which it could
transition to state S and the probability o f that transition occurring. For example, the
probability that the TMR system will be in state 3 at time t + At depends on the
probability that the system was in state 3 at time t (since the system can only transition to
state 3 from state 3) and the probability of the system transitioning from state 3 back into
itself. In mathematical form, the equations from the three states are
Pj (t + At ) = (1 - 3/lAt) P 3 (0
P 2 {t + At) = (3/lAt) P 3 (t) + (1 - 2ÀAt) P 2it)
Pp (t + At) = (2ÀAt)p^ (t) + pp it)
where p .it) is the probability o f being in state i at time t and p^it + At) is the
probability o f being in state at time t +At _
The Markov models considered thus far have been discrete-time ones in which state
transitions occur at fixed time interval A t . It is possible to model systems using the
continuous-time Markov model [6 ], in which state transitions can occur at any point in
time. The continuous-time equations can be derived from the discrete-time equations by
allowing the time interval At to approach zero. After simple algebraic manipulations and
taking the limit as At approaches zero results in a set o f differential equations given by
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^

= -3 M (0

^

= iXp,it)-2Xp2(t)

Using o f the Laplace transforms (initial conditions:

(0) - 1 ,

(0) = 0,

(0) = 0. )

results in the solution to the above differential equations

Pyr(t) = l- 3 e - ^ '^ + 2 e - ^ ^ '
Reliability o f the TMR system is the probability o f being in either state 3 or state 2, so
= P3(^) + P 2 (0 =

-2 g -3 ^

_

The TMR system has been used as an example to show how the Markov model can
be used to model systems which would be difficult to be modeled in the combinatorial
models. Meanwhile, Markov models can also be used to model systems with repair. This
is out o f the scope o f our investigation for the robustness o f the star graph and will not be
covered in our study. The interested readers can refer to [2][6] for more details.
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CHAPTER 3

DISTANCE RELIABILITY
In this chapter, we propose a two-terminal reliability measure referred to as Distanee
Reliability (DR) between any two given nodes u and I with the shortest distance, in an 17dimensional star graph,

to assess the robustness o f the star graph. Due to the fact that

there exist numerous ways o f constructing disjoint paths between u and I if w’s
representation has more than one cycles, we only consider the special case o f u having a
single cycle under the node failure model, link failure model, and node/link failure
models, respectively. For each failure model, two different cases depending on the
relative positions o f the source and destinations nodes are investigated to derive DR. This
analysis gives us a basic understanding o f DR. Conservative comparisons with the
hypercube tell us that, DR o f the star graph is expected to be closer to that o f the
hypercube when more cycles for the node representation and numerous ways o f
constructing disjoint paths are considered. Furthermore, DR

for the antipodal

communication is discussed as a special case. Lower bounds on the antipode reliability
are derived under each failure model.

3.1

Background

Due to the high similarity between the hypercube and the star network [2] [3], the star
network is highly robust. It has been proved that the conneetivity among nodes in this
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topology can be preserved despite a substantial number o f failures (in terms o f node, link
or node/link failures). This fact motivates us to look beyond the concept o f connectivity,
and demand more o f this topology in terms o f efficient communications. This poses
stringent requirements on the connection o f two nodes: i.e., not only two nodes have to be
conneeted, but the distance between them must be the shortest. This idea consequently
leads to a distance constrained reliability parameter which serves as a useful assessment
to determine the communication delay, link-node utilization, and robustness in an
interconnection network. Hence, we define Distance Reliability (DR) as the probability o f
having an operational path with the optimal distance between two given nodes u and /. A
combinatorial approach has been used to evaluate DR especially for u having a single
cycle in a S„, under the node failure model, link failure model, and node/link failure
models, respectively. From Chapter 1, we know that antipode(s) is the farthest node(s)
from a given node with the distance o f diameter (d„) o f the star graph [4]. There exists
more than one antipode for a given node in the star graph. Thus, DR for the basic
antipodal communication is discussed as a special case here. For the antipodal
communication, different lower bounds on DR are also derived in this chapter.

3.2

Node failure model

Let F be the set o f faulty nodes with |F| denoted as the number o f the faulty nodes.
Here, we only focus on the case with at most |F| node failures. Links are assumed to be
perfect under this model. The objective in this model is to find DR, i.e. the probability o f
having at least one operational path with the shortest distance between u and 1 in the
presence o f node failures. A path is considered to be operational if it passes through fault-
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free intermediary nodes between u and /. From Chapter 1, depending on the symbol in
the leftmost position o f the source permutation label being ‘ 1’ or not, the node-disjoint
paths between u and I are categorized into two different cases, and the shortest distance
between them is either c+w or c+m- 2 , where c is the number o f cycles o f length at least
2, and m is the number of misplaced symbols for the node permutation of u. For the
purpose o f simplicity, we use “r ” to denote the shortest distance between u and I in the
rest of this chapter.
3.2.1

Case I; n{\) = \

There are m optimal node-disjoint paths o f the shortest distance c+m, and n-m -\ nonoptimal paths of distance c+m + 2 between u and /, where m < n , c < [ ( « - l ) / 2 j , and
r = c +m .
Definition 1. The union o f all m optimal disjoint paths existing between u and I is
referred to as a (u, 7)-container. Total distinct nodes existing in this container are
m{r -1 ) + 2 . In the container, u and I are always assumed to be fault-free.
Lemma 1. If 1F |< m , there will be at least one optimal operational path between u and I.
Proof. In a star network there are m node-disjoint parallel paths o f the shortest distance r
between u and 1. Each faulty node can at most belong to one path and since \ F \ < m ,
there will be at least one optimal path remaining operational between u and 1 .
Corollary 1. A star network is distance reliable for pairs o f u and /, if | F |< w . Therefore
it follows:
DR = I, when \ F \ < m
Now we investigate DR when \F\=m. If all faults happen to locate in all but one o f the
optimal paths, one optimal fault-free path between u and I can be guaranteed. Here we
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consider the worst ease scenario: m faults distributions destroy all optimal paths. For a
given

u

with

only

one

cycle

representation

,

where

2 < ij <n, 1 < j <m, r = w +1, the union o f all m optimal disjoint paths between u and /

in the {u, 7)-container can be listed as follows:
V2*3 ' ' '

h h H ■■■^mhh
hW5 ■■■W ih h

' ' ' ^m-2^m—dm
All these disjoint optimal paths can be represented using a simple parallel reliability
block diagram, where each path contains m distinct nodes. Scenarios that fail all optimal
paths when | f | = m , happen only where each path exactly contains one fault, including
cases where all neighbors o f w or 7 are faulty. The probability associated with this event is
Pr(all r-pths destroyed when |f | = m)
m

m
vl y vl y

v ly

v^ y

y

The above equation accounts for all scenarios that destroy all m optimal paths.
Subtraction o f the probability o f occurrence o f these scenarios from 1 will naturally give
the probability o f having at least one operational optimal path in the container and thus
the DR.
Now let us determine the probability o f having at least one operational optimal path
when m < \ F \ < m ^ - m (note that if \F \> m ^ - m , then DR^ = 0 ). In practice, | f | is
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expected to be much less than this limit. We proceed to enumerate N i , the number o f
faults distributions that render exactly one optimal fault-free path. For a container having
nodes except u and I, any fault distributions that occur outside one optimal path

qualifies in our enumeration. It follows that W -

^ m2 - m ^

. However, we cannot simply

,1^1
multiply N-[ by m to get the total faults distributions as some distributions will be double
counted. To adjust this figure, we need to subtract by those occur outside any 2 optimal
paths, and then add back those occur outside any 3 optimal paths, and so on (Principle of
Inclusion and Exclusion). It follows that
/

2
\
m - im

, where 1 < / < w - 2

,1^1
The total number o f fault distributions N that will render at least one fault-free
m -2

I

N f . This can be interpreted as the

optimal path is given hy. N = E (-I)-'
7=1

sum of the number o f fault distributions that will render one optimal path fault-free,
subtracted by the number o f fault distributions that will render two optimal paths
fault-fee, added by the number o f fault distributions that will render three optimal
paths fault-free, and so on. Therefore, we have the following result.
Theorem 1; The probability o f having at least one operational optimal path between u
(with a single cycle representation (/j/ 2 - f,»), where 2 < i j <n, I < j < m ) and I when
m < \F \< n ? ‘ - m is given by:
m-2

DR = N I

,

= I (-1)-/+'
7=1

N j/
v,^,y
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The result given in Theorem 1, however, does not consider the node cycle
representation having cycles more than one. In [6], Misic proved that cycles for the node
representation have such properties: cycles can appear in any order; cycles without “ I ”
inside ean be executed to reach the same destination regardless o f the number o f cyclic
shifts on the symbols; and cycles without “ 1” inside can be nested in any other cycle. If
we do not consider the nesting o f cycles and we assume all the cycles are o f noneordinary type (without “ 1” inside), the number o f optimal paths is , F , , where k is
number o f cycles and

denotes the number o f distinct symbols in each cycle Q . Day [2]

gave one possible way o f constructing a set o f node-disjoint paths between two given
nodes. In fact there exist numerous ways o f constructing disjoint paths between u and /
when the number o f cycles is greater than one.
Based on above-mentioned properties o f cycles, for example, 24 optimal paths exist
between «(13254) (decomposed into cycles (23)(45)) and 7(12345) through the following
sequence:
2-3-2-4-5-4

3-2-3-4-5-4

4-5-4-3-2-3

5-4-5-3-2-3

2-3-2-5-4-5

3-2-3-5-4-5

4-5-4-2-3-2

5-4-5-2-3-2

2-4-5-4-3-2

3-4-5-4-2-3

4-2-3-2-5-4

5-2-3-2-4-5

2-3-4-5-4-2

3-2-4-5-4-3

4-5-2-3-2-4

5-4-2-3-2-5

2-5-4-5-3-2

3-5-4-5-2-3

4-3-2-3-5-4

5-3-2-3-4-5

2-3-5-4-5-2

3-2-5-4-5-3

4-5-3-2-3-4

5-4-3-2-3-5

Between these optimal paths, there exist more than one way o f constructing four
disjoint paths between u and 7. Besides the set o f disjoint paths in Fig. 3.1 (a) (explained
in Day [2]), three more sets o f node disjoint paths (shown in Fig. 3.1 (b)~(d) where
nodes/links different from (a) are plotted in grey color) ean also be constructed. The
number o f optimal paths between two given nodes when the node permutation is
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decomposed into more than one cycle is going to be huge and difficult to determine. For
instance, there exist more than 192 optimal paths between w(1325476) and 7(1234567)
even only considering the nesting o f one cycle. Meanwhile the ways o f constructing
disjoint paths will be more and it appears to be impossible to derive a deterministic
formula to find out all. Therefore, we only discuss the distance reliability for the source
node having a single cycle representation. When the number o f cycles for the node
representation is greater than one, the problem o f determining DR appears to be difficult
in the star graph. A thorough investigation o f DR for the general case is still under
development and remains to be an open problem.
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Fig. 3.1. Multiple ways o f constructing four disjoint paths
between w(13254) and 7(12345).

To compare DR o f the star graph with that o f the hypercube, we use the same shortest
distance between two given nodes u and 7 for both networks. However, the number of
optimal paths and nodes in the container o f the star graph is less than those o f the
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hypercube. The container in the star graph has r-\ optimal paths and { r - \ f nodes, while
the container in the hypercube has r! optimal paths and 2'^ nodes. This explains why the
DR o f the hypercube is higher than that o f the star graph in Fig. 3.2. And the DR o f the
star graph in Fig. 3.2 shows an appreciable improvement with the increase o f the shortest
distance r. If more cycles for the node representation are considered, and more alternative
ways o f constructing node disjoint paths in the star graph are taken into account; hence
DR of the star graph is expected to be closer to that o f the hypercube.

I sta r

B Hypercube

lFl=2r-2

P 0.4

6
7
8
9
Shortest Distance (r)

10

11

Fig. 3.2. DRs for star graph and hypercube when \F\=lr-l.

3.2.2 Case II: ;r(l) ^ I
The container under this case has c optimal paths of the shortest distance c+m-2, m-cI paths o f distance c+m, and n-m paths o f distance c+m+2 between u and /
( m< n , c < [ « / 2 j , a n d r = c + m - 2 ) with c ( r - I ) + 2 distinct nodes. There will be at
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least one operational path between u and / if | F |< c. For a given u with only one cycle
presentation (l/p^ •••*)«) > where 2 < i j < n , 1 < j < m ,

r = m - \ , there exists only one

optimal path and hence one arbitrary node fault will destroy it. On the other hand if w’s
representation has more than one cycle, DR when [F |> c is difficult to determine due to
the numerous ways o f constructing disjoint paths between u and /. Therefore, we will
only consider Case I for the link failure model and the combined node/link failure model.
3.2.3

Special case: antipode reliability

Since the number o f antipodes is more than one (for n>3) [4], the antipodal
communication we are concerned about is the communication between u and its unique
basic antipode (assuming to be 7). Due to the symmetry property in the star network,
similar analysis can be extended to the communication between the source node and
other antipodes. The basic antipode can be reached from the source node by applying the
following permutations:
<^max = (1)(23)(45) •••(/,/ +1) ••• (n -1 , n),

for odd n\

= (l)(2 3 4 )(5 6 )...(i,, + l ) . . ( » - ! , « )
for even n
As such, the antipodal communication can be performed concurrently according to
the following sequences:
2- 3- 2

j - (/ +1) - / • • • ( « - 1) - « - ( « - 1),

for odd «;

2 - 3 - 4 - 2 • •• /- ( / + 1)- r •■•(«-1) - « - ( « - 1) or
2 - 3 - 4 - 3 • •• /- (/ +1) - / • • • ( « - 1) - « - ( « - 1), for even n.

To have at least one operational optimal path between u and 7, two different scenarios
need to be considered.
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Scenario 1. When n is odd, there are a total o f « - 1 disjoint paths o f the shortest length
between u and I ( ;r(l) ~ l , m = n - l , c = ( n - l ) / 2 ,r = c + m = [3(« -1 ) / 2 J =

).

Paths distributions can be verified by the following example. For example, there are
six node-disjoint paths between u and / when n = l. Based on the above discussion, a total
six disjoint paths can be formulated based on the following permutations:
(1)

2-3-2-4-5-4-6-7-6

(2)

3-2-4-5-4-6-7-6-3

(3)
(4)

4-5-4-6-7-6-2-3-2
5-4-6-7-6-2-3-2-5

(5)

6 —7 —6 —4 —5 —4 —2 —3 —2

(6)

7-6-4-S-4-2-3-2-7

Antipode reliability is actually a special case of the distance reliability discussed in
Section 3.2.1. In which, the source node can be decomposed into { n - \ ) ! 2 cycles, each
o f length 2. From the discussion in Section 3.2.1 we know that the determination o f the
antipode reliability using the combinatorial method when the number o f cycles for the
node permutation is more than one, is difficult due to the numerous ways o f constructing
the disjoint paths and many faults distributions. Under this circumstance, and for a given
IF I obtained from the network reliability data and its mission time, we can develop a
reliability expression based on a stochastic model as follows.
In the stochastic graph model G(F, E) for the star network S„, the following
assumptions are made:
•

Source and destination nodes are always fault-free;

•

The operational probabilities o f all nodes (links) are the same and equal to p„ {pi). For
a given constant failure rate À , using the exponential model one can compute pi (p„
or pi) as pi(i) = exp(-/lt) ;
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•

Failures are independent and identically distributed.
A Boolean technique for the reliability evaluation starts with a sum o f products

expression for min-paths and converts it into an equivalent sum o f disjoint products
(SDP) expression [5]. In the SDP form, an UP or success (DOWN or failure) state o f a
or { \ - p ^ ) , and the Boolean sum (product) by the

node is replaced by its reliability

arithmetic sum (product). In other words, the SDP expression is interpreted directly as an
equivalent probability expression o f symbolic reliability. Let P \ , P 2 , ... , f/, be all r-paths
between u and /. Then the SDP expression is obtained as follows: P^ + P^P^ +... +
where P . , denotes the DOWN event o f the path Pj. The probability o f UP (operational)
for the

term

P ^P ^P ^ ■■•Pi-\

can be evaluated using the conditional probability and the

standard Boolean operations, and is called the disjoint product event. It has been shown
that the reliability evaluation for star networks with non-disjoint paths is NP-hard [1]. As
distinct optimal paths between u and I

mentioned in Chapter I, there are

even without considering the nesting o f cycles if we consider the maximum value o f m
and c. Clearly, for the same reason, the determination o f DR is also intractable. Thus, we
will attempt to do the next best thing, i.e. derive bounds on DR o f the node-disjoint paths.
A lower bound on DR can be obtained by considering only the set o f n-\ nodedisjoint paths between u and / with the shortest distance r as

DK>i-(i- p:-'E
The above expression uses the principles for a simple parallel reliability block
diagram. Note that this lower bound is quite pessimistic; even for small size star
networks, it renders a large deviation. Next we present a tight lower bound by
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constructing the hexagons between u and I

since every cycle

out o f total

c = ( « - l ) / 2 = r / 3 has two distinct symbols inside, and hence provides two alternatives
to construct the disjoint paths. Consider two nodes u and /, i.e. r = 3 when « is 3. There
are only two node-disjoint 3-paths (Fig. 3.3 a). The expression for DRs can be attributed
to the following: d r ^

■

n-2

n-3

n-1

n-3

n-1

n-2
(C )

Figure 3.3. Hexagon construction o f disjoint paths between u and its basic antipode I.

When n=5, there are two hexagons between u and I having four node-disjoint paths.
Since each cycle provides two alternative choices to construct the node-disjoint optimal
paths, thus, the corresponding DR can be obtained as follows shown in Fig. 3.3 b:

Similarly, extending the above concept to the general case where r = 2(n -1 ) / 3, the
following equation holds for DRp.
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D R> \=

p 7^

, where r = 3,6,9,•••,3 (« -1 )/2

1
0 .9
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Figure 3.4. Lower bounds on the antipode reliability for different values of
the node reliability (Scenario 1).

These two lower bounds are compared under different values o f the node reliability
= 0.91 and 0.68, respectively. The gap between the tight lower bound on the antipode
reliability with the help o f constructing the hexagons and the lower bound applying the
simple parallel reliability block diagram becomes larger with the increase o f the node
reliability. Furthermore, results in Figure 3.4 verify that the tight lower bound shows the
appreciable improvement on the antipode reliability over the pessimistic lower bound
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especially for the larger node reliability and large size o f the star graph. The dashdot lines
in Fig. 3.4 represent the antipode reliability in the hypercube. The large gap between the
antipode reliabilities o f the hypercube and the star graph is due to the fact that there is a
single antipode for a given node in the hypercube. The antipode reliability in the star
graph is expected to be even higher than that in the hypercube when numerous ways o f
constructing disjoint paths are considered.

n-2

n-3

n-1

n-1

(a)

n-2

4

n-3

n-1

n-3

n-2

(b)

Figure 3.5. Hexagon construction o f disjoint paths between u and its basic antipode /.

Scenario 2. W hen n is even, there are two choices o f the permutations for the source node
to reach the basic antipode, where m = n - l , c = ( n - 2 ) / 2 or

m - n , c = n / 2 , and

r = ( 3 n - 4 ) / 2 . Paths distribution shown in Figure 3.5, are similar to Scenario 1 except
the first cycle o f length either 3 or 1. The tight lower bounds for DR under this scenario
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are given as follows using the same strategy as Scenario 1. These two lower bounds are
compared in Fig. 3.6 under different values o f the node reliabilities p„ = 0.91 and 0.68,
respectively. The antipode reliability between a given node and its single antipode
reliability in the hypercube is also presented.
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D R ^ > \ - { \ - p I)
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Figure 3.6. Lower bounds on the antipode reliability for different values of
the node reliability (Scenario 2).

3.3

Link failure model

This section analyzes DR under the link failure model with at most | F | failures,
where F represents the set o f faulty links. Nodes are assumed to be perfect under this
model. As with the node failures, the interest is in the system configuration that has at
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least one operational optimal path between u and / in the presence o f link failures. Since
the DR analysis and the antipode reliability under the link failure model are same as what
have been performed in the node failure model, detailed analysis are not repeated here.
Hence we give the results directly. The only difference is that considered network
elements per optimal path here are r-1 links instead o f r nodes per optimal path in the
node failure model.
The probability o f having at least one operational optimal path between u (with a
where 2 < /,• < «, 1 < j < m ) a nd / when m < \ F \<m^ - \ is

cycle presentation (tp2 given by:
m-2

D R = H (-1) 7+1
J
y=i

N j/

where N j =

'f '

y

VI

m(m + l ) - j ( m + i)

, 1< j < m - 2

,1^1

The above result does not consider the node cycle representation having cycles more
than one. Due to the fact that there exist numerous ways of constructing disjoint paths
between u and /, the problem o f determining DR when the number o f cycles for the node
representation under the link failure model is greater than one appears to be difficult.
The antipode reliability under this model can be analyzed similarly to the node failure
mode described in Section 3.2.3. For the case scenario 1 where n is odd, the pessimistic
lower bound using the simple parallel block diagram, and the tight lower bound with the
help o f the construction o f hexagons, are given as follows:
f

\2f/3

>l-(l-;?;)

DR^>\- 1

-

=

1

and

{^-Pf )

-

, where r = 3,6,9, - , 3 ( » - l ) / 2
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3.4

Combined node and link failure model

In the previous two sections, we only assume either nodes or links eould fail.
However, all network components (nodes or links) can fail in real applications. A
combined failure model is developed to analyze D R under the case with at most |F|
failures, where F represents the sum o f faulty nodes and links. As with the node failure
model, the interest is in the system that has at least one operational optimal path between
u and I in the presence of node/link failures.
3.4.1

Case I: 7t(\) - 1

There are m optimal node-disjoint paths o f the shortest distance c + m , and n - m - \
non-optimal

paths

of

c +m +l

distance

between

u

and

I

{ m<n, c < [ ( n - l ) / 2 j , and r - c + m). Total distinct nodes and links in this container
are m{2r -1 ) + 2 . The conclusion that there will be at least one operational path between
u and I can be guaranteed if | f | < w .
Now we investigate DR when \F\=m. If all faults happen to reside in all but one o f the
optimal paths, one optimal fault-free path between u and I can be guaranteed. Here we
consider the worst case scenario: m faults distributions destroy all optimal paths. For a
given

u

with

only

one

cycle

representation

{ h h " ' ^ m)

»

where

2 <i j <n, 1 < j <m, r = m + \, scenarios that fail all optimal paths when | f | = w , happen

only where each path exactly contains one fault (either node or link), including cases
where all neighbors o f w or / are faulty. The probability associated with this event ean be
obtained similarly as Case I in Section 3.2
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Pr(all r-pths destroyed when | f | = m)
m

2/77 + 1

2/77 + 1

2/77 + 1

777(2/77 + 1)

1

1

1

777

m

The above equation accounts for all scenarios that destroy all m optimal paths.
Subtraction o f the probability o f occurrence o f these events from 1 will naturally give the
probability o f having at least one operational path in the container and thus the DR.
Now let us determine the probability o f having at least one operational optimal path
when 777 <1F |< (/77 - l)(2/w +1) (note that if |F | > (/77-l)(2/77 + l) , then D F ^ = 0 ) . In
practice, | f | is expected to be much less than this limit. The analysis can be carried out
similarly to Case 1 in Section 3.2. The total number of fault distributions N that will
777—2

■, 1

render at least one fault-free optimal path is given hy. N = Z (-1)-'

777(2777 + 1) - 7 (2777 + 1)
If I

N j

\J

7=1

Nj =

^777^

, where

J

, and 1 < j < m - 2 . Therefore, we have the following result.

Theorem 2: The probability o f having at least one operational optimal path between u
(with a cycle presentation (/j/ 2 " ' D

, where 2 < i j < n , l < j < m ) and I when

777 <1F |< (777 - 1)(2/77 +1) is given by:
(777

DR = N I

- 1)(2/77 + 1)

^777^
=Y (-i)^+'

,1^1

V

7=1

^ (7 7 7

- I)(2/77 + 1)^

Nj/
lfl

Theorem 2, similar to Theorem 1, however, does not consider the node cycle
representation having cycles more than one. Due to the fact that there exist numerous
ways o f constructing disjoint paths between u and /, the problem o f determining DR
when the number o f cycles is greater than one appears to be difficult.
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3.4.2

Case II: ;t (1) +1

There will be at least one operational path between u and I if | F |< c . Now we
investigate DR when |F|^c. For a given u with only one cycle presentation (b‘1 / 2

’

where 2 < ij <n, I < j < m , r - m - l , there exists only one optimal path and hence one
arbitrary node fault will destroy it. DR when | F |> c is difficult to determine due to the
numerous ways o f constructing disjoint paths between u and I if the number o f cycles for
the node representation is greater than one.
3.4.3

Special case: antipode reliability

The antipode reliability under this model can be analyzed similarly to the node failure
mode described in Section 3.2.3. For the case scenario 1 where n is odd, the pessimistic
lower bound using the simple parallel block diagram, and the tight lower bound with the
help of the construction o f hexagons, are given as follows

M ,> l- ( l- p ;> ;r

=1-(1 -

"

(2

- p Ip]

and

. where r = 3,6,9 ■■■3(n -1) / 2

These two lower bounds shown in Fig. 3.7 are compared under different values o f the
node/link reliabilities, respectively. The gap between the tight lower bound on the
antipode reliability using the hexagons and the lower bound applying the simple parallel
reliability block diagram becomes even larger than the node failure model with the
increase o f the node/link reliability. This is due to the fact that both o f nodes and links
can fail is closer to the real applications. The dashdot lines in Fig. 3.7 represent the
antipode reliability under different node/link reliabilities in the hypercube. The large gap
77
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between the antipode reliabilities o f the hypercube and the star graph is due to the fact
that there is a single antipode for a given node in the hypercube.
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Figure 3.7. Lower bounds on the antipode reliability for different node reliabilities.

3.5

Conclusion

In this chapter, a figure o f merit called distance reliability was introduced for the
reliability analysis o f star interconnection networks. This measure is appealing for the
robust networks (such as star network) since it poses stringent requirements on the
connection o f two nodes; i.e. not only do two nodes have to be eonnected, but the
distance between them must be the shortest. We presented a deterministic formulation o f
the distance reliability especially between u having a single cycle representation and I
when the number o f faults is bounded using the combinatorial method. For each o f the
node, link and node/link failure models, two different cases depending on the relative
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positions o f the source & destination, were analyzed to compute DR. The antipodal
reliability was also considered as a special case to further demonstrate the fault tolerance
o f star networks. Lower bounds on the antipode reliability were derived and proven to be
more tolerant that the hypercube through the comparisons between similar size star and
hypercube networks.
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CHAPTER 4

MARKOV RELIABILITY MODELING
In this chapter, the degradation o f a container between two given nodes u and I in a S„
having at least one operational shortest path is examined to measure the system
effectiveness in the presence o f failures. This measure is evaluated under the node failure,
link failure, node/link combined failure models, respectively. Failure o f the container is
defined as being when no fault-free optimal path remains operational between u and 1 .
States o f the degradation o f a container between u and I in a S„ are modeled by a Markov
chain. The solution to transition state functions is derived and the MTTF (mean time to
failure) for them under each failure model is also computed. For comparisons the results
o f similar size containers of the hypercube is presented.
Notation:
«-dimensional star network
Sq

system state with no failures

S j.

system state - j: number o f failed optimal operational paths in the (u, /^-container;
/: number o f failures
^'-independent failure rate o f system nodes

À,

i'-independent failure rate o f system links

t

time
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p. {t)

Pr I system is in S j}

Pq

Laplace transform o f Pj

R j{t) probability that j optimal paths in the (w, i)-container have failed
Tj

MTTF estimate when there are j failed optimal communication paths between u
an d /.

4.1

Background

In the previous chapter, the distanee reliability (J)R) merit has been proposed to
evaluate the reliability o f the star graph. With this merit, two given nodes u and / in any
{u, 7)-container in a S„ are expected to not only be connected but to be apart by the
optimal distance (i.e. the shortest distance between the source and destination nodes).
Although the first fault (node or link) makes one o f optimal paths between u and I in the
(u, /)-container unavailable, it is important to know how many fault-Ifee optimal paths
are available in the damaged structure? The degradation o f a eontainer in a S„ having at
least one operational optimal path with the shortest distance between two given nodes u
and / is examined to measure the system effectiveness in the presence o f failures. System
is considered failed when there is no operational optimal path between u and /. The
process of the degradation can be modeled by a Markov chain [3]. It is difficult to give an
explicit reliability expression for a large system when there are many components and a
diverse reliability structure. Therefore, we turn our attention to MTTF (mean time to
failure) [2] used to describe the robustness o f star networks.
To compare the reliability and degradation o f the star graph to those o f the hypercube,
a similar analysis o f impacts o f node and link failures on the star graph is provided here;
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the number o f nodes (and links) o f a container between two given nodes u and I in the
star graph is not the same as that for the hypercube interconnection topology. The star
graph is based on a factorial growth in the number o f nodes, while the hypercube is based
on a power-of-2 growth in the number o f nodes. For example, a star graph o f dimension
o f 4 has 4! (24) nodes and a hypereube o f dimension 4 has 2"* (16) nodes. Consequently, a
container in a

has 9 (maximum) nodes, while a container in Q4 has 12 (maximum)

nodes. This makes a direct comparison difficult; however conservative comparisons are
made where possible between the reliability and degradation o f similar size containers in
the star graph and the hypercube.
Here we only consider arbitrary and i'-independent failure o f nodes and links such
that the probability o f occurrences o f a specific node or link failure is not affected by the
previous failures. The method for characterizing the degradation o f a eontainer in a S„ is
based on maintaining the maximum number o f optimal paths between two given nodes u
and I in the presence of tolerable number o f failures. In some cases, a particular sequence
o f failures can present different degradation possibilities; however, specific sequences o f
failures are unlikely to occur and are not included in analysis here.
We can assume that whenever a failure renders an r-path faulty, that faulty r-path no
longer belongs to the container: r-paths are isolated as soon as they fail. The system at Sj,
has, in general, additional fault-free nodes/links belonging to an already faulty r-paths in
the (u, /)-container; they do not need to be considered in their subsequent failure analysis
since they do not affect the system failure anymore.
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We start to analyze the degradation o f the container in a S„ under the node failure
model first, then continue the analysis under the link failure model and the combined
node/link failure model.

4.2

Node failure model

In this section, we focus on the scenario having at most F failures, where |F|
represents the set o f faulty nodes. Links are perfect and considered to be negligible
compared to the processor failures under the node failure model. The general objective is
to keep at least one operational disjoint path o f the shortest distanee between two given
nodes u and / in the presence o f node failures. A path is operational if it passes through
fault-free intermediary nodes. And a path is said to be optimal if it is o f the shortest
distance between u and I. From Chapter I, we know that the shortest distance o f paths
between u and / is either c+m or c+m -2 depending on the first symbol in the leftmost
position o f the permutation label o f the source node being “ 1” or not.
4.2.1

Case 1 7r(l) = l

There are m optimal disjoint paths o f the shortest distance c+m, and n-m -\ nonoptimal paths o f distance c+m +2 between u and /

{ m < n , c < \ j j i - \ ) l 2 \ , r = c + m).

Total distinct nodes in a {u, 7)-container are k = m{r - 1) except u and /.
Consider a (u, i)-eontainer in a S„, the first failure o f an arbitrary node always leaves
exactly one o f these m optimal paths failed and keeps the rest undamaged. To damage all
o f the m paths, at least m node failures are necessary. On the other hand, although as few
as m node failures (out of k nodes in the {u, i)-container) could possibly destroy all the r-
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paths, this scenario is highly unlikely under the assumption that node failures are
arbitrary and ^-independently distributed.
Consider three disjoint parallel paths o f the minimum distance 4 between the source
node «(1342) and the destination node 7(1234) in a S 4 shown in Fig. 4.1. Definition 1 tells
that there are 9 distinct nodes except u and I in this {u, 7)-container each o f which
containing 3 distinct nodes with the same possibility o f failing (« and I are assumed to be
always fault-free).

3142

4132

2134

4312

2314

3214
/(1234)

«(1342)
2341

3241

4231

Figure 4.1. Three node-disjoint optimal paths between «(1342) and 7(1234).

In Fig. 4.2, the first failure o f an arbitrary node damages one o f three 4-paths, and the
system enters state 5i,i; then the system has eight nodes which are equal likely to fail. At
the next node failure, the system enters state 82,2 with the probability 6/8, and enters state
S \2 with the probability 2/8. Similarly, other state transitions can be explained. For
example, in state 82,2 any further node failure forces the system into state 82,2 with the
probability 3/7, etc. In each o f the states 82 ,\, 3 < / < 7 , there remains no operational 4path. These system states are important collectively because the system fails when no
fault-free 4-path is available. The states in Fig. 4.2 are arranged such that states that
represent a common number o f failed 4-paths is arranged vertically and the degradation
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o f ^-paths is arranged horizontally. This analysis can be extended to any container in star
networks with different sizes. Similar state diagrams can be achieved with the different
width and height, but the pattern remains essentially the same.

6/8
2/8

3/7

4/7
6/7

3/6

1/7

6/6
’2,4

2/5

Sj,i w h e r e
j = # o f failed r-path
I = # o f failed n o d e s

1/4

' 2,6

in a (u, /^-container o f S 4.

Figure 4.2. State diagram for

Consider Sjj, for a given {u, /)-container, there are {m-j) fault-free disjoint parallel
optimal paths between u and I, each o f which has (r-1) fault-free nodes; there are {k-i)
fault-free nodes in the container. Because failures are ^-independent with the equal
probability of failing, the probability that the next node-failure damages a fault-free
optimal path is then:

k -i

Hence the probability that next node failure does not damage a fault-free optimal path
is:
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1

k -i
Starting with a fault-free state So, the state diagram for a {u, i)-container under the
node failure model is demonstrated in Fig. 4.3. The corresponding state transition rates
are rj =

(w - y )(r -1 ), 0 < j < m .

1

—

1—
M

Si

1

—

)------------------------►( S

2

j

►

•

•

•

----------7-M

S,

Figure 4.3. Simple state diagram under the node-failure model for
a (u, i)-container in a S„.

The state transition expressions for the first three states are:
/q (^ + At) = (1 - H)At)io (0 =>

- ~ ^ qPq

P\{t + S t) = r^StPQ(t)4 -(l-rjA t)P i(t) => - ^ =

Pl{^ + At) = /|AtPi(t) + (l-r2 A t)i^ (t) =>

- rj/l

= rjPj - ^ 2 - ^ 2

Similarly, we can derive the state transition function o f the state j as follows:
dP:

P j (t + At) = ry_i AtPy_i + (1 - r jS t) P j = > - ^ =

- r jP j , for 1 < y < w

The initial and final conditions for the states probabilities are:
Po(0) = 1,

P y (0 )

= 0 for 1 < y < OT

T’ (oo) = 0 for 0 < j <m, f^(oo) = 1
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After the Laplace transformation,
s P , -1 =

P, = ^

P. = iîr P « =

“

=■ Fo(0 = exp(-roO

^ P, ( 0 = ^ e x p ( - ^ 0 + ; ^ e x p ( - n / )

s+r2

*

^ + —
5+^0 + 5+P]
s+r2 )

s+r2 5+P] 5+ro

=> ^ 2 (0 = A) exp(-rot) + 4 exp(-rit) + A 2 exp(-r 2 t)
Next we are going to find these three parameters Ao-Ay.
A —
'bn
/
^ “ (f-H/bX'^+nX'^+nz)^

w_

A _

\|

_
W\
~ (n-'bX'z-'b)

nin
(■s+'bX‘5+nX.5'+'2) : ( ^ + n ) L .

_

nin
(fQ-nXnz-n)

n>n

n>n

(f+mX'^+nX'^+nz)

(fQ-f^Xn-'b)

Now we have the solution to the f^ (t) :

To compute 4 , for 2 < y < w , observe that

P » = ^ P » -i= ,n ^ ,

x_,=i

This suggests a solution o f the form

P jit)= i

A exp(-/% t),

k=0

where Ak, 0 < k < j are constants o f integration determined by solving this equation:

A p r V i A : .
which gives:
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A u --

ri n_i
-0 ri (n-nt)
î=0, i^k

This gives a general form solution to P /t):

^ . ( 0 = (/on '

(t)-n )(nz - n )" (n -n )

(t) - f j )(n - r j )-(ry_, -ry )

7Îot(0 is the probability that there is no single fault-free optimal operational path in the
(u, i)-container, i.e., the container has failed according to the failure definition. Hence,
the probability that j optimal paths in the {u, 7)-eontainer has failed, R jit) is given as
follows
4 ) ( 0 = ^o(0
R j (0 = Rj_x (0 -h Pj (0 , for 1 < y < m
It is difficult to give an explicit reliability expression for a large system when there
are many components and a diverse reliability structure. In our case, there exist
numerous numbers o f nodes in a container between two given nodes u and / with the
increase o f the size o f the star graph. One method o f simplifying this situation is to
calculate the MTTF (mean time to failure), T j , computed according to the following
formula:

_ 1_

1
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=

J_ + [

n>

ü

n -'b ro

+^ X ]

7b-n n

= -L+-L

n

D

1
Â„m(c+m-l)

■ + -

Â„(m-l)(c+m-l)

In the same way, we can derive the mean time to failure for the state J,
Tj = ^ R j ( l ) d l
= Jo [ s P m d t
k=0

k=0

y-i

0

^ "7'

= ^ M + jo^ ^
-

k=0

= 7}._1+ Z ^
k=0 ^

= T. 1 + ___________

-L + ___________

( ' i - ' b ) ( ' 2 - ' b ) - ( o - '( 3 ) 'b

W l-P j-l

± + ...

( % - n X '2 - n ) " ( 'y - n ) n

1

j:-

1

+ 7--------- 77--------- 7—7----------- r —, f o r l <
( 'b “ O' X rz ~ r j ) " ( / ) _ , - r j ) r j

.

j< m

The resulting Tj for a (u, 7)-containers o f different sizes in a S„ are shown in Table

4.1 (Àfj = 10”^ / hours as in [1]), where we only consider containers with the maximum
values o f m and c.In other words, the eontainer we are considering here has the largest
number o f nodes for a given size o f the star graph. For comparisons with other popular
interconnection networks. Table 4.2 shows the MTTF estimates for similar size
containers in the hypercube network, where Tj captures a scenario that all faulty nodes
are confined into a eontainer o f a

. (In this ease, we are considering such situations
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where a (m, /)-container in Qr, having n node-disjoint parallel paths o f the optimal
distance n between u and I).

Table 4.1. MTTF Values (Hours) for various size containers in star networks
under the node failure model (Case 1),

= 10

/hour.

# of
n

nodes in

To

Ti

T2

Ts

T4

T5

Te

T?

container
3

4

25000

75000

4

9

11111

27778

61111

5

20

5000

11667

21667

81667

6

30

3333

7500

13056

104722

121389

7

48

2083

4583

7708

116042

122292

134792

8

63

1587

3439

5661

144550

148254

153810

164921

9

88

1136

2435

3950

158496

160768

163799

168344

177435

Comparisons o f the star network and the hypercube are approximate because the
number o f nodes involved does not match, and the degradation methods o f two systems
differ: a container in the star graph consists o îm { m = n - \ ) optimal paths o f the shortest
distance, r = n - \ + n -\ , between u and I while a container in the hypercube consists
o f n optimal disjoint paths o f the shortest distance n.
However, when a similar number o f nodes exist for the containers in two different
networks, the responses to the initial few failures can be used to compare the reliability
and degradation o f containers in the star graph to those in the hypercube. To be
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conservative, comparisons are generally made between the hypercube with a slightly
lesser number o f nodes than the respective star graphs; e.g., 56 nodes in a container
having 8 disjoint paths with the optimal length 8 in Qs compared to 63 nodes in a
container having 7 disjoint paths with the optimal length 10 in %.

Table 4.2. MTTF Values (Hours) for various size containers in hypercube networks
under the node failure model,

= 10

/hour.

# of
n

nodes in

To

Ti

T2

T3

T4

Te

Te

Tj

Ts

container
3

6

16667 41667

91667

4

12

8333

19444

36111

69444

5

20

5000

11250

19583

32083

57083

6

30

3333

7333

12333

19000

29000

49000

7

42

2381

5159

8492

12659

18214

26548

43214

8

56

1786

3827

6207

9065

12636

17398

24541

38827

9

72

1389

2951

4737

6820

9320

12445

16612

22862

35362

The time o f the first failure is a function o f number o f nodes, and is therefore
equivalent to that o f a similar size container in the hypercube, e.g., 3,333 hours for the 30
nodes in a container o f Se versus 3,333 hours for the 30 nodes in a container o f Qe.
However, the time of the second and subsequent failures for the 30 nodes in a container
in a Se shows an appreciable improvement over the 30 nodes in a container in a Qe. As
the number o f nodes increases, the improved reliability of the star network becomes
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more apparent. For example, for a container (63 nodes) in Ss versus a container (56
nodes) in Qg, the MTTF o f the container in Qg is still less than 24,541 hours for the first
seven states while the MTTF o f the container in Sg continues to climb to nearly 164,921
hours even the MTTF o f the first three states o f the degradation o f the container in Qg
show a little advantages over the container in Sg.
4.2.2

Case 2 ttQ) ^ 1

There are c parallel disjoint paths o f the shortest distance c+m-2, m -c-l paths o f
distance

c+m,

and

n-m

paths

of

distance

c+m +2

u

between

and

/

{ m < n ,c < Y , a n d r = c + w - 2 ). Total distinct nodes in a {u, 7)-container are
k = c(r -1 ) except u and 1 .

1—ZqA?

1—
W

Sy]

T

►( S 2

)----------- ►

•

•

•

►(

S,

tqA /

Figure 4.4. State diagram in the node failure model for a (u, 7)-container in a S„ (Case 2).

This case is the same as Case 1 except the different numbers o f disjoint paths and
nodes in the container between u and 1. Hence, the Markov analysis o f the degradation of
a container in S„ under this case can be implemented similarly to Case 1. The state
diagram for this case under the node failure model is shown in Fig. 4.4. The state
transition rates are given as
rj

0 < j< c .
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The

corresponding

MTTF

to

this

case

are

derived based

on

the

R j (t) = Rj_^{t) + P j(f), for 1 < j < c as

ro

1

+

i

A„c(c+w-3)

fori<;sc

k=0

Table 4.3. MTTF values (Flours) for various size containers in star networks
under the node failure model (case 2),

= 10“^/hour.

# o f nodes in
n
container

To

Tj

T2

n

T4

T,

4

6

16667

50000

6

18

5556

13889

30556

9

40

2500

5833

10833

20833

10

60

1667

3750

6528

10694

19028

12

90

1111

2444

4111

6333

9667

16333

14

126

794

1720

2831

4220

6071

8849

T6

14405

The resulting Tj for a {u, /)-container o f different sizes are shown in Table 4.3

{Xfj =10”^ / hours as in [1]). Since the Markov analysis for this case is the same as
Case 1 except different transition rates, the analysis for the link failure model and the
combined node/link failure model will only consider the first case where ;r(l) = 1.
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faeet

And for brevity, the definition o f the container is not going to be defined in next two
fault models.

4.3

Link failure model

This section considers the robustness o f the star network under the link failure model
with at most F link failures, where |F| represents the set o f faulty links. Nodes are
assumed to be perfect under this model. As with link failures, the interest is in the system
configuration that has at least one operational optimal path between u and 1 in the
presence o f link failures. Total distinct links existing in the container is k = m{c + m)
except u and /. Begin with a fault-free container in a S„, where the links can fail sindependently at a constant rate; then find when the container does not have an
operational optimal path.
Compared with Case 1 in the node failure model, the only difference is that we
consider mr links here instead o f w ( r - l ) nodes in the node failure model while
maintaining m disjoint optimal paths in a container between two given nodes u and /.
Therefore, the Markov analysis of the degradation of a container in a S„ under the link
failure model can be performed similarly as Case 1 in the node failure model. The state
diagram under the link failure model is shown in Fig. 4.5.

1—

1—rjA/

\ - r 2 l4 t

W Si )-------------- ►( S2 )------ ► • • •

►
( Si

Figure 4.5. State diagram in the link failure model for a (w, 7)-container in a S„.
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The state transition expressions are:
rj = À i(m - j) r , 0 < j < m .
The solutions o f the state equations are similar to those for the node-failure case. The
initial and final conditions for the probabilities are:
F()(0) = 1, Pj(0) = 0 for 1 < j <m
Pj{<x>) = 0 for 0 < j <m, F^(oo) = 1
Pq(/) = exp(-roO, % =

+m -\)

Once P.{t), 0<]<m are determined, the expressions for Tj are derived similarly as that
in the node failure model.
^ -

Tf = T , _ i + i \

fo rl < j< m

The resulting Tj for {u, 7)-containers o f different sizes in star networks o f various

dimensions are shown in Table 4.4; (A/ = 10“^/hour as in [1]). Table 4.5 shows the
reliability estimates (MTTF) for similar sized containers in hypercube. In this model,
comparisons are made between hypercube with a slightly more number o f links than the
respective star graph; e.g., 36 links in a container having 6 disjoint paths with the optimal
length 6 in Qe compared to 35 links in a container having 4 disjoint paths with the
optimal length o f 5 in %.
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Table 4.4. MTTF values (Hours) for various size containers in star networks
under the link failure model, A/ = 10 ^/hour.

#of
n

links in

To

Ti

T2

Ts

T4

Ts

Te

Tj

container
3

6

166667

500000

4

12

83333

208333

458333

5

24

41667

97222

180556

347222

6

35

28571

64286

111905

183333

326190

7

54

18519

40741

68519

105556

161111

272222

8

70

14286

30952

50952

75952

109286

159286

259286

9

96

10417

22321

36210

52877

73710

101488

143155

226488

The time o f the first failure is a function o f the number o f links, and is therefore close
to that o f a similar size container in hypercube, e.g., 28,571 hours for the 35 links in a
container o f a Sg versus 27,778 hours for the 36 links in a container o f a Qe. However,
the time o f the second and subsequent failures for the 35 links o f a Se shows the
appreciable improvement over the 36 links o f a Qe. As the number o f links increases, the
improved reliability o f the star network becomes more apparent. For example, the mean
time to the fourth link failure in the container (35 links) in a Se has climbed to 326,190
hours, while the mean time to the fourth link failure in the container (36 links) in a Qe
just climbed to 241,667 hours. And this trend is believed to continue to improve for the
MTTF of subsequent failures.
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Table 4.5. MTTF values (Hours) for vànous size containers in hypercube networks
under the link failure model, A/ = 10

/hour.

# of

n

links in

To

T,

T2

Ts

T4

Ts

Te

T?

Ts

container
3

9

111111

277778

611111

4

16

62500

145833

270833

520833

5

25

40000

90000

156667

256667 456667

6

36

27778

61111

102778

158333

241667

408333

7

49

20408

44218

72789

108503

156122

227551

370408

8

64

15625

33482

54315

79315

110565

152232

214732

339732

9

81

12346

26235

42108

60626

82848

110626

147663

203219

4.4

314330

Combined node and link failure model

So far cases were considered where either nodes or links eould fail. Realistically, all
network eomponents ean fail. A combined model is developed by assuming sindependent and different failure rates for nodes and links in the star networks. All nodes
have the same probability o f failing

, while all links have the same probability failing

Ài . Total distinct components including nodes and links existing in a eontainer is
k = m[{c + m -1 ) + (c + m)] except u and /.
Similar analysis as the node failure model in Section 4.2 is carried out here. The state
diagram under the combined node/link failure model is shown in Fig. 4.6. The state
transition rates are given as follows:
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Vj

\ —r ç ^

j){c + m - \ ) + X i{m - j){c + m), 0 < j < m .

1—

%Af

W :Sl

I---------------------►( S 2 I----------►

V i/

•

•

•

---------- —M 81

Figure 4.6. State diagram in the combined node and link failure model
for a {u, 7)-container in a S„.

The state transition analysis will be same as the node failure model. The
corresponding MTTF to each state are given as follows:
1

Ta =

Tj = Tj_i + Z — , for 1 < j <m

The resulting reliability estimates for different containers in star networks and
hypercubes o f various dimensions are shown in Tables 4.6 and 4.7. Comparisons o f the
star graph and the hypercube under the combined node/link failure model, is
approximately done between similar size containers; e.g., 44 elements (including nodes
and links) in a container having 4 disjoint paths with the shortest distance 6 in a 5^
compared with 45 elements in a container having 5 disjoint paths with the shortest
distance 5 in a Q 5 .
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Table 4.6. MTTF values (Hours) for various size containers in star networks
under the combined node/link failure model,

= 10~^ /hour, A/ = 10“^ /hour.

# o f elements
n

Ti

To

T3

T2

T4

Ts

Te

Ti

in container
3

10

21739

65217

4

21

9804

24510

53922

5

44

4464

10417

19345

37202

6

65

2985

6716

11692

19154

34080

7

102

1873

4120

6929

10674

16292

27528

8

133

1429

3095

5095

7595

10929

15929

25929

9

184

1025

2196

3562

5201

7250

9982

14081

22278

Table 4.7. MTTF values (Hours) for various size containers in hypercube networks
under the combined node/link failure model,

= 1 0 '^ /hour, Xj - 10“^/hour.

# of
n

elements in

To

T,

T2

T3

T4

Ts

T?

Te

Ts

container
3

15

14493

36232

79710

4

28

7353

17157

31863

61275

5

45

4444

10000

17407

28519

50741

6

66

2976

6548

11012

16964

25893

43750

7

91

2132

4620

7605

11336

16311

23774

38699

8

120

1603

3434

5571

8135

11340

15614

22024

34844

9

153

1248

2653

4258

6131

8378

11187

14932

20550
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3r%6

The time o f the first two failures in S 5 is slight higher than Qs, but the MTTF o f the
subsequent failures for 44 elements in a container in a Ss show the appreciable
improvements over the 45 elements in a container in a Qs. For example, the mean time to
the third failures (either node or link) in a container in a Ss (44 elements) has climbed to
37,202 hours, while the mean time to the third failures (either node or link) in a container
(45 elements) in a g j i s still 28,519 hours.

4.5

Conclusion

In this chapter, the robustness o f star networks was studied under the node, link, and
combined node/line failure models. The degradation o f a container in a S„ having at least
one operational optimal path with the shortest distanee between two given nodes u and 1
was examined to measure the system effeetiveness in the presence o f failures. For each
failure model, two different cases depending on the relative positions o f the source &
destination nodes were considered to assess the star network. The states o f the
degradation o f a container were modeled by a Markov chain. The solution to each
transition state was derived, and values o f MTTF (mean time to failure) for each failure
model were computed and compared with similar size containers in the hypercube.
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CHAPTER 5

SUBSTAR RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
In this chapter, we derive an upper hound on the («-l)-star reliability in a S„ using the
probability fault model. We also compute an approximation on the («-l)-star reliability
by considering only disjoint {n-\) stars under the fixed partitioning. The numerical results
show that the (w-l)-star reliabilities under the probability fault model and the
approximation approach are in good agreement especially for the low value o f the node
reliability. And the numerical results are also shown to he consistent with and close to the
simulation results. Conservative comparisons are made where possible between the («-1)network reliability o f similar size star graphs and hypercubes.
Notation:
N\

N -n !, the number o f nodes in a 5"».

p\

node reliability defined as the probability that the node is operational at time t.

SnA{af.

defined as

, which is a (n-l)-star in a S„ such that the

position

o f its label has the fixed value a,-, where a, e {1,2,3, --, n} and i e {2,3,4, ••-, n},
and all other positions are assigned with J f s and superscripts are the repetition
factors.
R„-i(ad'-

defined as the reliability o f the (n-l)-star S'„_i(a,j.

Rn,n-m(p)- defined as the probability that there exists a fault-free S„.m in a S„.
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7 î„ „ -l(p ,/) : defined as the R„^n-\ip) under the fixed partitioning along the
dimension, where 2 < i < n .
f.

number o f faulty nodes in a S„.

_ n (n

1)

(n
m'.

m + l).

o f combinations o f m components selected from a set o f

n components.

5.1

Background

As the size o f a system grows, the probability o f a fault occurring in the system
increases. It is important to quantify the effect o f the faults, so the fault-tolerant design
can be pursued. Normally, reliability is used to evaluate the fault toleranee o f a
multiprocessor system. The reliability o f a system as a function o f time, R(t), is defined
as the probability that the system has survived the interval [to, t], given that it was
operational at time /q. A traditional measure o f the reliability evaluation is terminal
reliability, such as all terminal reliability and distance reliability, o f a computer network
[6] [7]. Others are task-based reliability, defined as the probability that some minimum
number o f connected nodes are available in the system for the task execution [3], and
substar reliability [2], defined as the probability that a fault-free subnetwork (a smaller
dimension network with the same topological properties as the original one) is still
available in the network in the presence o f a tolerable number o f faults. A similar idea
with the aim o f finding the minimum number o f failed nodes or links to destroy all
available substars has been studied and reported in [5]. In designing parallel processors
using the star network as the interconnection topology as well as in designing real
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applications on such processors, the estimates o f these reliabilities are important in
choosing algorithms and predicting their performance under different failure conditions.
Among these reliability measures, the substar reliability is the most practical one because
a user in the current star multiproeessors is given a speeific substar for the execution of
his/her program.
In this chapter, we adopt the probability fault model (originally proposed in [2] to
derive the suhcube reliability in the hypercuhe network) to study the substar reliability of
the star graph. An upper bound for the Rn,n-\iP ) using the probability fault model is
derived. The Rn,n-\iP ) is obtained by forming all available distinct S„-\'s first, and then
applying the principle o f inclusion and exclusion [1] to get an upper bound while only
considering the first three terms in the reliability formula since the fourth term is negative
and dominate all the remaining terms. Meanwhile, an approximation on the R„^n-\(p) is
obtained by considering only disjoint («-l)-stars under the partitioning along the fixed
dimension.

Numerical results

show that the probability

fault model

and the

approximation approach are in good agreement especially for the low value o f the node
reliability. A search algorithm is developed to find the R„ yi^\{p) in the star graph under
a given number o f node faults.
The reliability o f the hypercube network is well known. Models exist to analyze the
reliability o f the hypercube under both node and link failure schemes [2] [4] [6]. To
compare the reliability of the star graph with that o f the hypercube, a similar analysis o f
impacts o f node failures on the star graph is provided here; the number o f nodes in the
star graph is not the same as that for the hypercube interconnection network. The star
graph is based on a factorial growth in the number o f nodes, while the hypercube is based
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on a power-of-2 growth in the number o f nodes. This makes a direct comparison difficult;
however conservative comparisons are made where possible between the reliability of
similar size star graphs and hypercubes.
We assume that processors in the system have the homogenous reliability function.
The failures o f processors are assumed to be statistically independent and link failures are
negligible compared to the processor failures. The reliability function o f each node can
have any failure distribution. The node reliability function can include the maintenance
and repair capabilities o f the node.

5.2

Analysis o f the (»-!)-star reliability under the probahility fault model

In this section, an upper hound on the («-l)-star reliability under the prohability fault
model is derived first. In the probability fault model, the probability that a suhstar is
operational is represented hy the reliability o f processors in the suhstar. The («-w)-star
reliability o f an «-dimensional star graph, can be formulated as the union o f the
probabilistic events that all possible («-«î)-stars are operational. Since the terms in the (««z)-star reliability obtained above may not be mutually disjoint, a technique to convert the
reliability formula into one with only mutually disjoint terms is needed. The basic method
used to compute the network reliahility in the probability fault model is called the
Principle o f Inclusion and Exclusion {PIEI). This principle is not efficient for calculating
the reliability o f the general networks. However, we show that it is useful for the star
network reliability analysis.
To derive the («-l)-star reliability in this model, all distinct

= « ( « - ! ) («-!)-

stars are formed first. Then the («-l)-star reliahility is expressed as the union o f the
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reliability o f these « (« -1 ) («-l)-stars. Since the prohahilistic terms in the expression o f
the («-l)-star reliahility are not mutually disjoint, the key to calculate the («-l)-star
reliability is to convert the original reliability expression into one containing only disjoint
terms. Let Q denote the probahility that one («-l)-star is operational, then the (o-l)-star
reliability can be represented according to the PIE as follows:
n («-l)-l

Z

j

Q + (-l)

!=0

CjCj (pair)

Z
i,j=0,l,-,n {n-Y )-\

( 1)
+ (—1)

CjC jCj^Cj (quadra) ■

Z

;=0
Each Cj can be represented by the reliability o f the ( « - ! ) ! nodes in its corresponding S„.

1

. In the following, we derive an upper bound on the R„^„-iip) in a S„. We

,

consider
R„^l(p) =

a

simple

case

first.

The

5",

reliability

can

be

easily

obtained

as

p ) ^ because the only instance where there is no fault-free 5", in a S„ is

when all the nodes are faulty. Before deriving the main result, we need the following
lemmas.
Since terms in (1) are not mutually disjoint, we need to find the common nodes in any
two or more 5'„.i’s by considering the intersection between them to derive the R„^„-\(p) .
To find these common nodes between any 5'„.i’s, first we study how distinct S„.\’s pair
up. In the following, three different ways in which 5’„ .i’s pair up are listed:
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(a) paired S„.Ts with the empty intersection where fixed digits in the («-!)-stars are
distinct and in the same position. For instance, the empty intersection between
X X X 4 and XX X 3 in a S 4.
(b) paired V -i’s with the empty intersection where fixed digits in the («-l)-stars are
the same and in different positions. For instance, the empty intersection hetween
X X X 4 and X X 4 X in a S 4.
(c) paired 5/,-i’s with the non-empty intersection where fixed digits in the («-l)-stars
are distinct and in different positions. For instance, the non-empty intersection
between X X X 4 and X X 3 X inaS'.^.
Based on the construction conditions o f the pairs between distinct 5'„.i’s listed above,
the number of total pairs for each case in a S„ are given as follows:

( « - ! ) since two distinct fixed digits can be selected from n distinct digits.

(a)
v2y

and the same position can be the
(b) n

one, where 2 < i < n .

since the fixed digit can be any o f n distinct digits, and two different
v2

y

positions can be selected from these i positions, where 2 < i < n .

(c)

since two distinct fixed digits can he selected from n distinct digits.

2

v2y v2

y

and two different positions can be selected from these i positions, where 2 < i < n .
The total number o f above-mentioned S„.\ pairs in a S„ equals to

n {n -V f
v2

example, there are 15 pairs o f % 's in a % as follows:
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. For

(ZY3,A% 2), (AT3,A%1), (AT2,A%1), (%3%,%2W ), (W3W,%1%),
(a)

(^2yir,W Lir)

(b) (A T 3,W 3Z ), (A%2,vir2vr), (vQTl,%lvir)

(A%3,W2Z), (A%3,yiriW), (A%2,%1Z), (AT2,W3yir), (ATl,yir3yir),
(A%1,%2%)
Cases (a) and (b) can be combined and extended to the general scenario where the
intersection between m { 2 < m < n ) % .i’s is empty, while case (c) can he generalized to
the scenario where m distinct %-i’s intersect into a S„-m- Thus, the above results can be
generalized to the following lemmas.
LEM M A 1. There are { 2 n - m - l )

ways that the intersection between m disjoint (n-

\)-stars is empty.
Proof. Cases (a) and (b) can be generalized to the intersection between m disjoint %-i’s;

or (b) are (« -1 )

Adding them gives (2« -

«7

-1 )

and n

« -1 ^

respectively.

. The intersection between these %-i’s is empty since

they are disjoint to each other. Q.E.D.

LEM M A 2. There are m\

ways that m distinct %-i’s in a n-star intersect into
y

a (n-m)-star.
Proof for this lemma can be obtained directly from the process o f generalizing type (c) S„.
I’s, where m fixed digits for each o f these %-i’s are distinct and in different m positions.
This number happens to be the same as the number o f distinct %-m’s in a S„\
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m!

LEM M A 3. The total number o f nodes in m distinct %-i’s (type c) which intersect into a
(n-m)-star equals to Z (-1) i-\
/=!

(n - z) !.

Proof. We shall see that m type (c) S„.\’s intersect into a (zz-z«)-star. Thus, hy the PIE, the
W

number o f nodes in these %-i’s can be obtained as Z (-1)

7 -1

(zz-z)!, i.e., the sum of

Z=1

the number o f nodes in these %-Ts, subtracted by the number o f nodes in the intersections
hetween any two % .,'s, added hy the number o f nodes in the intersections between any
three % .,'s, and so on. Q.E.D.
For example, the intersection between three (5-l)-stars (type c) XXXX5, XXX4X, and
XX3XX, is a (5-3)-star X¥234. It is easy to see that the total number o f nodes in these
three (5-1 )-stars equals to 3 x 4 !-2 x 3 !+ 1 x 2 ! = 62.
To derive the 7?„ „_j(/z), we not only need to consider scenarios where (zz-1)-stars
overlap with either empty or non-empty intersections as stated in Lemmas 1-3, also
scenarios where (zz-l)-stars intersect in other numerous ways. For example, there are four
scenarios where three distinct (zz-l)-stars intersect, and more than eight scenarios where
four distinct (zz-l)-stars intersect, etc. To keep the problem tractable, we only consider
seenarios where up to three (zz-l)-stars are selected to derive the R„^„-\{p) . Before
deriving the general formula to find the total number o f scenarios when three (zz-l)-stars
intersect in a S„, we start with a simple example as the following.
Besides the two scenarios (a) and (b) shown in Fig. 5.1 as stated in Lemmas 1 and 2,
there are two more scenarios where three out o f twelve (4-l)-stars intersect in a %.
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Scenario (c): there are 36 ways to seleet two (4-1)-stars such that they intersect
into a (4-2)-star according to Lemma 2. For each o f them, there are two ehoices to
select the third (4-l)-star whieh dose not interseet with either o f them. For
instance, % Qf4,Æ Y3%,%QT3 and % Q f4,A % 3% ,A T4vir.
Scenario (d): similar to (c), there are 36 ways to select two (4-l)-stars such that
they intersect into a (4-2)-star. For each o f them, there are three ehoiees to seleet
the third (4-l)-star which will only intersect with one o f the two earlier selected
(4-l)-stars. For instanee, X X X 4 , X X 3 X , X X 2 X , X X X 4 , X X 3 X , X X 1 X , and

XX3X XXX4

XXX4

XXX3

XXX4 XX3X

XXX3

XXX4 XX3X

AX4X

XXX2
XX3X X2XX

Œ

XX2X

0

X X3X XXX4 X 3XX

scenario (a)

scenario (b)

scenario (c)

scenario (d)

Figure 5.1. Scenarios where three (4-l)-stars intersect.

The results o f the above example now can be generalized to the scenario where three
% .i’s intersect in a S„ in the following lemma.
LEM M A 4. There are ( 4 « - 6 )

« -V
v2y v2

ways that three %_,'s intersect similarly to

y

scenarios (c) and (d) in Fig. 5.1.
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Proof: Lemma 2 gives 2!

ways that two % .i’s intersect with each other. For
V /

y

each o f these ways, there are two choices to seleet the third S„.\ which does not intersect
with either o f the earlier selected %_i’s similarly to scenario (c) in Fig. 5.1; while there
are

^n-2\

+

(n-3^
vl

y

= 2 /7-5 choices to select the third S„.\ which intersect with only one

y

o f the earlier selected % .,'s similarly to scenario (d) in Fig. 5.1. Adding them gives the
total number o f ways that three % .i’s intersect similarly to scenarios (c) and (d) in Fig.
5.1: (4/7-6)

^/7^ ^/7 -V
v^y V

•

. Q.E.D.

y

Summing numbers in Lemmas 1 ,3 , and 4 when m equals to 3 gives the total ways

that three (//-l)-stars intersect:

^n(n-Vf

under each scenario are 3(/7-l)! ,

. The number o f nodes in these three (/7-l)-stars

Z (-1) i - l

( n - i ) \ , 3 (/7 -l)! - ( //- 2 ) ! , and

i=\

3(/7 -1 ) ! - 2(/7 - 2) !. The corresponding probabilities o f these three (/7-l)-stars under each

scenario

are

given

as

(2 /7 -4 )

^/7^

^ /7 -l^

3(/7-1)!

P

v3y

(2 /7 - 5 )p3(/7-l)!-2(/z-2)!^
v2y v 2

y

^ n
v3y v 3

Before using these Lemmas to derive the

V^yv^
3

-)/=i

m

y

(3

/

, respectively.

y

, two simple examples are

introduced as follows.
Example 1. For n=3, there are 6 distinct (3-l)-stars in a %. Based on the PIE, the
i ? 3 3 _l(;/) can be computed as:
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5

j

i q -

j^ k

z

1=0

qCj+

07=0,1, ,5

+

z

j^ k ^ l

q C jQ -

;V ,t= 0 ,l,„ ,5

z

qqqq

;,7 ,t,;= 0 ,l,-,5

CjCjCi^CiC^ - n Cj

I

i =0

i,j,k,l,m =0,\,-,5

the R^^s-iip) can be interpreted as the sum of the reliability of (3 - l )!=2 nodes in six
distinct (3 -l)-stars, subtracted by the reliability of nodes in the union of fifteen pairs of
distinct (3 -l)-stars, added by the reliability of nodes in the union of twenty triple of
distinct (3 -l)-stars, and so on. Each term in the R^^^-iip) is listed as:
•

First term:

Cq

+ C j + C2 + C3 + C4 +

= bp^

CqCj + CqCj + CqCj + CqC^ + CqCj + CjC2 +

•

+ C"jC4 +

Second term (pairs): QC5 + C2C3 + C2C4 + C2C5 + C3C4 + C3C5 + C4C5
= 9p ‘^+ 6p^
+ Q Q Q + C q Q Q + Q Q V 5 + C0 C2 C3 + C0 C2 C4 +
CQC2 C5 + CQC3 C4 + CQC3 C5 + CQC4 C5 + CjC 2 C3 +

•

Third term (triple) : Cj C2C4 + Cj C2 C5 + Q C3C4 + Cj C3C5 + Cj C4 C5 +
C2 C3 C4 + C2 C3 C3 + C2 C4 C3 + C3 C4 C3

= 2p^ +I2p^ + 6p ‘^
C qC jC2C3 + C qC jC2C4 + C qC jC2C3 + CQCJC3C4 +
+ C 0 C 1C 4 C 5 + C 0 C2 C 3 C 4 + C 0 C 2 C 3C 5 +

•

Fourth term (quadra-): CQC2C4C3 + CqC^C^C^ + CJC2C3C4 + C2C2C3C5 +
CJC2 C 4 C 3 + CJC3C 4 C 3 + C 2 C3C 4 C 3

= 9p^ + 6p^
C 0 Q C 2 C 3C 4 + C 0 C 1C 2 C 3C 5 + Q Q C 2 C 4 C 3 + C 0 Q C 3C 4 C 5 +

•

Fifth term (five):

,
C0 C2 C3 C4 C5 + q C 2 C3 C4 Q = 6 ;,^

•

Sixth term (six): C0QC2C3C4C3 = p^
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Adding

above six

terms

gives

% 3 - l ( P ) = ^ P ^ - ^ P ^ - '^P^ +

the

exact value

of

the

% 3 _i (p )

as

- '^P^ ■

Example 2. For «=4, there are 12 distinct %-i’s in a %. Each Q can be represented by
the reliability o f (4-l)!=6 nodes in its eorresponding %.i, for 0 < z < 11. Based on the PIE,
the

4

_i(/z) can be computed as
11

z# j ^ k

j

& ,4_iW = Z Q z-O

Z

QC. +

z j= 0 ,l,-,ll
j^ k ^ l

z

Z

QCyQ -

/,M = 0 ,1 ,-,1 1
11

’

CjCjCiçCi+— n Q

z ,y ,L /= 0 ,l,-,ll

z=0

where each term is the reliability o f the union o f several %_i’s. The i ? 4 4 _i(/z) can he
interpreted as the sum o f the reliability o f (4-l)!=6 nodes in every %_i, subtracted by the
reliability o f nodes in the union o f any pair % .i’s, added by the reliability of nodes in the
union o f any triple %_i’s, and so on. Following presents the first three terms for the

•

First term: \ 2 p ^ which corresponds to the scenario where each individual

is

operational.
•

Second term: two scenarios for any pair operational
•

Scenario (a): paired % .i’s with the

.

Scenario (b): paired % .,'s which intersect

’s.

empty intersection with the reliability

into a %_i with the reliability

3 6 fW .
•

Third term: four union scenarios for three operational

’s shown in Fig. 5.2.
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Scenarios (a): empty intersection between any pair o f three % .i’s with the
reliability \ 6 p ^ ^ .
Scenario (h): three distinct %_,'s intersect with each other with the reliahility

Scenario (c); two out o f three (4-l)-stars intersect in a

with the reliability

72p^\
Scenario (d): one

intersects with the other two respectively with the

reliahility 108/?^^.

(c)

(a)

(d )

Figure 5.2. Four scenarios when three out o f twelve (4-l)-stars intersect in a %.

As the number of the %.i ’s in each term for the 7?4 4 _ i(p ) increased, scenarios where
(«-l)-stars intersect become more complicated, making it difficult to enumerate all. Thus,
we give an upper bound on the
dominate

all

the

/? 4 4

remaining

_j(/>) here since the next term is negative and

ones

as

R^/^_i{p)<\2p^-

(36/)^®+30p^^) +

(2 4 /3 + 1 0 8 ^ 1 4 ^ 7 2 / ^ + 1 6 / ^ ) .
Theorem 1. Given a homogeneous node reliability p in a n-star, an upper bound on the
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_ n »(»-!)!_

n

n -\

Uj

v2

^i=\
y

+

v3y
+6

''n - Ÿ \

v3

2

; (-1)'

pi=\

-l/3\
. |(«-0!
VI

r

Proof: According to the PIE, the probability o f having a fault-free (n-l)-star is obtained
as
/Vj

k(m-1)-1
Z

^ w -l(« /) + ( - l )

/=0
rt
(-1)

J
I

I
R n -\{a i)R „ _ \{a j) +
/,7 = 0,l,-,« (w -l)-l

Rfi_i(ai)R„_i(aj)Rfj_i(ai^) + ---

(3)

i=0
where a, e {1,2,3, •••,«}, and i e { 2 ,3 ,4 ,- ,» } . Terms in (3) can be interpreted as, the sum
o f the probability that each (n-l)-star is operational, subtracted by the probabilities that
any two (n-l)-stars are operational, added by the probabilities that any three (n-1 {-stars
are operational, and so on.
Since it is difficult to enumerate all scenarios in (3) when four or more S„.\'s are
selected as the size o f the star graph increases, thus we give an upper bound on the
R n,n-l(p) by only considering the first three terms in (3) as

^n,n-\(p)-

j
22
R^_faj)Rjj_i{aj ) +
i,7=0,l,-,«(«-l)-l

«(«-l)-l
S
i=0
j^k
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because tbe fourth term is negative and dominate all the remaining ones. Next we derive
the expressions for tbe first three terms in terms o fp\
First term is tbe sum o f probabilities that each (n-l)-star is operational as

Second term is tbe union o f probabilities that two S„.\ \ are operational. There are two
possibilities: one is tbe i'n.i’s pair with tbe empty intersection (Lemma 1); tbe other is tbe
S'n-i’s pair that intersects into a S „.2 (Lemma 2). Tbe corresponding probabilities are

and 2

(2 » - 3 )
v2;

v2.

Third term is tbe union o f tbe probabilities that three 5„.rs are operational. There are
four different possibilities same as those in Fig. 5.2: tbe first is that tbe intersection
between three S„.\'s is empty; tbe second is that three

intersect into a

tbe third

is that only two out o f three 5'„.i’s intersect into a S„.2', tbe last is that tbe middle Sr,.\
intersects with tbe other two respectively. Tbe corresponding probabilities under each
scenario are given as (2n - 4) 'X pi{n 1)!

(Lemma

4),

3 (« -l)!-(« -2 )!

2), 4
\^ )

J

(Lemma
v2y v 2

y

(Lemmas 2 and 3).
v3y v 3

y

Adding tbe above three terms, we obtain tbe proof for Theorem 1. Q.E.D.

5.3

Approximation on i?„ „_i(/?) using tbe fixed partitioning
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4),

and

The basic idea is to determine

, the probability o f having at least one

operational Sn-\ in a S„, given that p is the reliability o f each node. It is well known that
the star graph is a highly robust network containing increasingly numerous substars as the
size of substars decreases. Therefore, we proceed to derive

by a combinatorial

approach.
In this section, the (n-1 {-reliability is approximated by considering tbe probabilities of
disjoint 5{,.i's under partitioning along tbe fixed dimensions. To do so, we first give a
pessimistic lower bound on tbe Rn^n-\iP)

considering tbe set o f disjoint 5„.i’s

along one fixed dimension. However, this approximation does not take into account any
disjoint Sn~\^ that may work correctly if we considered tbe partitioning along fixed
dimensions other than one. Thus, a tighter approximation on tbe

,j_i(jo{ is derived

later by ignoring tbe fact that Rn,n-\iPP ) values along two or more dimensions are not
independent.
There are total n { n - \ ) distinct S„.\^ in a S„. Partitioning a S„ along any dimension /,
2 < i < n , will render a set o f n disjoint 5'».fs. Tbe labels of these

s are obtained by

assigning an integer k, \ < k < n , X o dimension i, and X to all other dimensions. Clearly if
all nodes in at least one o f these S„.\^ are working properly with tbe node reliability p,
then R„^n-\ (P)-^ ■ Unfortunately, nodes in these distinct S„.i’s are not disjoint and
therefore we use a method to derive an approximate figure for tbe R n,n-\iP ) ■

doing

so, we first consider only tbe set of disjoint S„.\s by fixing one dimension (without tbe
loss of tbe generality we select tbe

dimension{. For a given S„.\, tbe reliability of this

S„.\ is represented by tbe reliability o f tbe (n-l{! nodes in it. For a given node reliability p.
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this can be

However, we cannot simply multiply this reliability by n to get the

R n,n-\iP ) along the

dimension. To adjust this figure, we need to subtract the

probabilities that two 5„-i’s along the

dimension are working correctly, and then add

hack the probabilities that three SnXs along the

dimension are working correctly, and

so on according to PIE. This is equivalent to the scenario where the probability that each
(n-l)-star is working correctly is disjoint to each other. Hence, a lower bound on the
Rrt,n-\iP) by considering disjoint («-l)-stars partitioned along the n'* dimension only, is
given as:

The approximation figure given in (4), however, does not take into account any
disjoint iS'n-i’s that may work correctly if we considered the partitioning along dimensions
other than the n'^ one. To improve this result, we could consider two different
approaches. One is to employ a second level o f PIE by finding the probability o f at least
one fault-free S„.\ along (i) one dimension, (ii) two dimensions, etc. This approach
becomes quickly complicated as we consider several dimensions at a time due to the
numerous ways that two or more S„.\'s can intersect, making it very difficult to
enumerate the common patterns. The second approach which yields an approximation is
by ignoring the fact that the

(/>,/) values along two or more dimensions are not

independent. After this relaxation, applying the PIE will give a more accurate
approximation on the Rn,n~\(^P) as the following:
n -\
i=\

y
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5.4

Results and analysis

In this seetion, we plot and compare the numerical results for the

n-\^P)

star

graphs of different sizes with the simulation. The node reliability is assumed to be
homogeneous and follows an exponential distribution with a eonstant failure rate À
(failures/hour). A seareh algorithm was developed to find the (n-1 {-reliability in the star
graph under a given number of faulty nodes. The number o f nodes eonsidered to be faulty
is determined using equations / = n ![l-e x p (-/lt{ ]. The faults were generated randomly
using a random permutation generator. The ranges for n and /

are chosen to be;

5 < « < 1 0 and 0 < / <100, respectively. For each scenario, the simulation was carried
out for 10,000 iterations and the results are compared with the numerical results under the
probability fault model and the fixed partitioning.
Fig. 5.3 depiets the Rn^n-\iP) using the results from the probability fault model in
(2{, the approximation in (4{ and (5{, and the simulation. The results from (4{ are far
below those from (5{ and the simulation since only disjoint 5'„_i’s partitioned along the
dimension are eonsidered. It is seen that the numerieal results under both the probability
fault model and the approximation approaeh (5{ are getting overlapped as the node
reliability decreases, and elose to the simulation results. This further verifies that the
Rfj,n-\(P) under these two approaehes are similarly aecurate. The large gap between the
probability fault model and the simulation results, especially under the large value o f the
node reliability, is due to the fact that the fourth term in (2{ is negative and large when
the size o f the star graph increases.
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Figure 5.3. The («-l)-reliabilities o f star graphs o f sizes 5, 7, 8, and 10.
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Comparisons o f the star networks and hypercubes are approximate because the
number o f nodes involved in both networks does not match, and the partitioning o f an ndimensional network into («-l)-dimensional networks differs: a star graph S„ can be
partitioned into n{n-\) distinct («-l)-stars in n -\ different ways, while a hypercube Q„ can
be partitioned into 2n distinct («-l)-cubes in n different ways. However, when a similar
number o f nodes exist for the two networks, the Rn^„-\{p) can be used to compare the
reliability between the star graph and the hypercube. To be conservative, comparisons are
generally made between hypercube with a slightly lesser number o f nodes than the
respective star graphs; e.g., 32,768 nodes in a Q\s compared to 40,320 nodes in a S%.
The dropping rate o f the («-l)-netw ork reliability shown in Fig. 5.4 is faster for the
hypercube than that for the star graph, e.g., the dropping rate for a Qj (128 nodes) versus
that for a

S5

(120 nodes). This is due to the fact that there are 20 distinct Ss.i's in a

S5,

while 14 distinct g?-I’s in a Qj. Furthermore, this trend continues to be even more
appreciable as the size o f the networks increases. For example, for a Ss, (40,320 nodes)
versus a g i; (32,768 nodes), the (M-l)-network reliability in Q\s quickly drops to zero
around 600 hours, while the («-l)-netw ork reliability in S% is almost one at the instance
t=600 hours and slowly decreases to zero until 2,000 hours. This is due the fact that there
are 8 x (8 -1 ) = 56 distinct % _/s in a 8-dimensional star graph %, while 2x15 = 30
distinct Qis-i’s in a 15-dimensional hypercube network Q\$,
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Figure 5.4. Approximate reliability comparisons between different size
star graphs and hypercubes.

5.5

Conclusion

Two different methods, the probability fault model and the approximation approach,
have been used to predict the substar reliability o f the star interconnection network. An
upper bound on the («-l)-star reliability in a S„ using the probability fault model was
derived, while an approximation on the («-l)-star reliability by considering only disjoint
(M-l)-stars under the fixed partitioning was computed. A search algorithm was developed
to find the («-l)-star reliability in the star graph for a given number o f node faults. The
numerical results under the probability fault model and the approximation approach were
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shown to be in good agreement especially for the low value o f the node reliability, also
consistent with and close to the simulation results. Conservative comparisons between
similar size star graphs and hypercubes proved that the star graph is more tolerant than
the hypercube in terms o f the (n-l)- network reliability.
Derivation o f the («-k)-star reliability can be represented by the reliability o f (n-k)\
nodes in each («-k)-star under the probability fault model by the PIE, and also can be
performed using the same approximation approach by considering disjoint (M-k)-stars
along a fixed set o f dimensions and applying the PIE. This task, however, is not simple
(computationally) and becomes complicated as the size o f the star graph and the value o f
k become large due to the numerous ways that («-kj-stars intersect. A more detailed
analysis using these approaches is currently under development to obtain a reasonably
accurate approximation on the actual («-k)-star reliability for k>\.
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this dissertation, three different reliability measures have been proposed to
investigate the robustness o f the star network under three different failure (node, link, and
combined node/link) models, respectively. The first is the distance reliability. The second
is the degradation of the container having at least one operational optimal path between
two given nodes in the star graph. The most practical one is the third one: substar
reliability.
The distance reliability, probability o f having an operational path with the optimal
distance between two given nodes u and I, poses stringent requirements on the connection
o f two arbitrary nodes in the star graph; i.e. not only do two nodes have to be connected,
but the distance between them must be the shortest. The combinatorial method was used
to determine the distance reliability when the number o f faults is bounded especially for
the node permutation label having a single cycle representation. For each o f the failure
models, two different cases depending on the relative positions o f the source &
destination, were analyzed to compute DR. Conservative DR comparisons with the
hypercube was carried out when the shortest distance between two given nodes is the
same for both the star graph and the hypercube. Even the DR in the hypercube is higher
than that in the star graph (for a single cycle representation), this study gave us an
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understanding o f DR in the star graph. And the DR in the star graph showed an
appreciable improvement with the increase the shortest distance. The DR in the star graph
was expected to be closer to that o f the hypercube when more than one cycles
representation and the numerous ways o f constructing disjoint paths were considered.
The communication between a given node and its basic antipode was considered as a
special case o f DR to further demonstrate the fault tolerance o f star networks. Lower
bounds on the antipode reliability were derived and compared with the antipode
reliahility in the hypercube. Comparisons results showed that the antipode reliability in
the star graph is higher than that in the hypercube due to the fact that there is more than
one antipode for a given node when the size o f the star graph is greater than 3 while a
given node in hypercube has a single antipode.
The degradation o f a container having at least one operational optimal path with the
shortest distance between two given nodes in a star graph was examined to measure the
system effectiveness in the presence of failures under three different failure models,
respectively. For each failure model, two different cases depending on the symbol in the
first position being “ 1” or not were considered to assess the star network. The states of
the degradation o f a container were modeled by a Markov chain. The values o f MTTF for
each transition state were computed and compared with the similar size containers in the
hypercube. Comparisons showed that the star graph is more robust than the hypercube.
Two different methods, the probability fault model and the approximation approach,
were used to derive the substar reliability. An upper bound on the («-l)-star reliability in
an «-dimensional star network under the probability fault model were derived by only
considering the first three terms since the fourth one is negative and dominate the
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remaining ones, while an approximation on the («-l)-star reliability by considering only
disjoint («-l)-stars under the partitioning along the fixed dimensions was computed. A
search algorithm was developed to find the («-l)-star reliability in the star graph for a
given number o f node faults, where faults were generated by a random permutation
generator. For each scenario, the simulation was carried out for 10,000 iterations. The
upper bound under the probability fault model and the approximation results by the
partitioning along the fixed dimensions, were shown to be in good agreement espeeially
for the low value of the node reliability, also consistent with and close to the simulation
results. Conservative comparisons between similar size star graphs and hypercubes
proved that the star graph is more tolerant than the hypercube in terms o f the («-1)network reliability.
Future research work includes:
•

The determination o f the distance reliability between the source node with more
than one cycle representation and the destination. Computer modeling to find out
the distance reliability and comparisons with the hypercube are necessary to
further investigate the robustness o f the star graph.

•

The («-l)-star reliability when considering the link failure only or combined
node/link failure is going to be determined in the future. Simulation results are
necessary to further verify the numerical results.

•

A more detailed analysis using the probability fault model or the fixed
partitioning is appreciated to obtain a reasonably accurate approximation on the
actual («-k)-star reliability for k>\. Simulation to find the (n-k)-star reliability is
also demanded to verify the numerical derivations.
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APPENDIX

MATLAB SIMULATION CODE
function [R sub sim] = simulation R (n, lamda, t)
N = factorial(n); % generate n! nodes
No n 1 = n*(n-l); sum = 0; R =0;
max fault = round( N* (l-exp(-lamda*t)) );
% Number o f fault nodes related with the node reliability
iterations = 10000;
% run 10,000 times to find the no. o f (n-l)-stars remaining operational
f = zeros(max_fault,n);% initialization o f the fault matrix
if (max fault < n )
R_sub_sim = 1; % if no. o f faults is less than n, reliability is T'
else
for k = 1:1 :iterations
for i=l:m ax fault
fault = randperm(n); % randomly generate a node fault
f(i,:) = fault(l,:);
% add each node fault to the faults matrix [dimension
%(max_fault, n) ]
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end
% node faults matrix
f = sort(f,l);
% sort the elements in each columns (2 to n) in ascending order
count = 0;
% used to record the no. o f different symbols in every column
%from 2 to n .
% This number is equal to the no. of (n-l)-star being destroyed,
for j = 2 :l;n
for i = 2.T m a x fa u lt
if(f(ij)> f(i-lj))

count = count + 1;
end
end
count = count +1;
end % end o f counting o f the no. o f distinct Sn-1 being destroyed
if (count >= N o_n_l)
R = 0;
% if count is greater than total no. o f Sn-ls, then R=0
else
R=l;
end
sum = sum + R; % record how many times that R=1

131

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

end % end of the iterations
sum;
R_sub_sim = sum/iterations;
end % end o f if statement
end
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